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PREFACE 
Ideology has been a dominating influence in twentieth century poli-
tics. Crucial struggles have been waged to win men's minds for fascism, 
democracy, and communism. It is a widely held opinion that the policy 
of a state is formulated in response to the demands of a particular ide-
ology. This contemporary ideological emphasis represents a significant 
change of emphasis in the historic view of politics. However, the power 
drives and goals of nations in pursuit of national self-interest cannot 
be manipulated so easily by diaphanous ideals. Which is predominate--
power or ideals? This dilemma was the motivation for a study of the 
clash of ideology and national interest in contemporary nations. The 
particular case in point was the Sino-Soviet dispute, but this paradox 
represents, I think, a wide-spread dilemma in many nations. 
I would like to express my appreciation to Dr. C. A. L. Rich for 
first illuminating this paradox in the behavior of men and nations, and 
for patiently and wisely guiding development of this endeavor. !·would 
also like to thank Dr. Harold v. Sare and Dr. Raymond Habiby for reading 
this thesis and offering constructive criticism. Lastly, a great debt 
is owed to the Department of Political Science for making this work 
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In 1950 an alliance was formed between the Soviet Union and Commu-
nist China. This alliance united two of the largest nations of the world 
in a mutual defense alliance. as well as in agreements of aid and cooper-
ation. v'In spite of traditional cultural differences and a history of 
discreet competition dating to Imperial times. the alliance was formu-
lated on the basis of their common adherence to Marxist-Leninist ideolo-
gy . The Sino-Soviet alliance was an awesome development in internation-
al relations and greatly enlarged the bloc of Communist nations. It ful-
filled the basic condition of an alliance--the sharing of a common enemy. 
In this case the enemy was Western capitalism and imperial ism. Both the 
Soviets and the Chinese emphasized that their alliance was based on pro-
letarian internationalism. thus free of the tensions and strains of ordi-
nary alliances between bourgeois states. Yet within a decade of its in-
ception the Sino-Soviet alliance was deeply rent by difficulties which 
have not yet been resolved. 
The unique aspect of the Sino-Soviet dispute is its method of en-
gagement. The dispute has been conducted in the frame of reference com-
mon to both states--Marxist-Leninist ideology. This was a natural course. 
as Marxism-Leninism not only provides the governing ideology for both 
states, but also provides them with a common perspective of viewing the 
world situation. However, the aesopian nature of the ideological 
l 
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language made it difficult for non-Communist observers to ascertain 
wheth~ in fact a dispute existed. It was speculated in the early 
stages of the Sino-Soviet exchanges that the quarrel was over ideologi-
cal interpretation. Like the Bible, Lenin's writings are vague in 
places, overly specific in others, and in general open to wide latitude 
of interpretation. For this reason the violent discussions of ideology 
gave the impression of an ideological quarrel--important, interesting 
perhaps, but not relevant to the world at large, of concern only to the 
Communist bloc. However, as the quarrel deepened it became couched less 
in ideological terms and more in terms of specific clashes of policy. 
The existence of basic Sino-Soviet differences became clear to all the 
world. 
}("' It was in the area of international politics that the dispute first 
became apparent. In specific instances, as the Taiwan Straits crisis of 
1958, China's invasions of India in 1958 and 1962, and the Middle East 
crisis of 1958, a divergence between Soviet and Chinese pronouncements 
and actions were noted. It was observed that China was voicing a more 
belligerent and antagonistic attitude than the Soviet Union. The ever-
present diat~ibe;/ against the United States were now coming from China, 
-------------rather than from the Soviet Union. *h!'ttshchev, in fact, had visited the 
United States and spoken highly of President Eisenhowel'. In view of the 
common adherence to Marxism-Leninism these actions presented a parado,(y~ 
There appeared to be a d~ho't£..m1: not only between Russian and Chinese 
actions, but also between Soviet actions and ideology. 
There had been much ideological discussion within the Communist 
bloc about the correct policies to be followed: toward the imperialists, 
toward non-communist countries not aligned with the West, and concerning 
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the correct path toward socialism. There appeared to be differences 
within the bloc on these questions, but because they were ideological in 
nature, this limited the scope of .the arguments, After 1960 it became 
apparent that much more was involved than ideology. A real conflict be-
tween the Soviet Union and Communist China had developed. The existence 
of the dispute forced a new appraisal of Marxism-Leninism by the bloc of 
states sharing this ideology. Traditional national interests and atti-
tudes began to be discussed and the struggle as to which was to take 
precedence in policy decisions--ideology or national interest--emerged. y' 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the causes of the Sino-
Soviet dispute, particularly in reference to the conflict between Marx-
ist-Leninist doctrine and the national interests of the Soviet Union and 
China. Several hypotheses have been formulated to guide the investiga-
tion. The first hypothesis is that the Sino-Soviet dispute is not an 
ideological quarrel, but rather disagreement caused by divergent nation-
al interests of the two countries. The divergent interests were held in 
check by the absolutism of Stalin, and upon his death began to assume 
their present shape. The second hypothesis is that the dispute origi-
nated because of changes in Soviet policy which were wrought by the new 
leadership of the Soviet Union, The new Soviet policies did not coin-
cide with the Chinese desire to become a Great Power. This then is the 
third hypothesis: China wishes to achieve Great Power status and recog-
nition of this status through the aid of the Soviet Union; however, the 
Soviet Union is not willing to sacrifice her own national interest to 
aid her socialist ally. This lends credence to the ineffectiveness of 
Marxist-Leninist ideology as a realistic bond of unity in Communist bloc 
politics, { 
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The first chapter is devoted to presenting a historical perspective / 
of the dispute. This will include a brief analytical survey of Imperial 
relations between Russia and China, as well as the historical relations 
between the Communist parties of the two countries. 
The second chapter provides a detailed presentation of the ideolo-
gical exchanges between the Soviet Union and China in the current dis-
pute. The emphasis of this chapter is on the ideological stands taken 
by the Soviet Union a~d China, but among the ideological arguments other 
issues of difference emerge. 
' I The third chapter discusses the role of ideology, both theoreti-
cally and with specifi c application to the Sino-Soviet dispute, It 
stresses the role. of the revolutionary experience in Russia and China as 
a perspective from which each country views the world, as well as the 
basic underlying differences between the two. 
Finally, the fourth chapter is an analysis of the foreign policies 
pursued by the Soviets and the Chinese, concentrating on the years 1956-
1960, showing the divergences between their policies and suggesting 
possible reasons. 
The conclusion will provide a summation of the thesis and hopefully 
verify the hypotheses set forth, 
In investigations of the Sino-Soviet dispute various methods of anal-
ysis have been· employed by political scienti~ts. These range from the 
ideologists, who intensively scrutinize all Marxist-Leninist pronounce-
ments of the Soviet Union, China and all the Communist nations, to a 
study of seating arrangements at banquets and the plotting of graphs ac-
cording to the number of lines in anniversary greetings. In this study, 
however, the methodology employed will be in the more traditional nature 
of a descriptive analysis. The hypotheses have been set forth and a 
study of the available data will hopefully verify them. The data and 
source material used in this study consist of primary sources in the 
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form of documents relating to alliances, statements of the Soviet Union 
and China relating to particular issues, and pronouncements of Marxist-
Leninist theories. These documents are mainly found in collections of 
documents. Very helpful in supplying information on incidents about 
which the involved governments may not wish to comment are comments of 
journalists who were actually "on the spot." Secondary sources in the 
form of discussions and analyses- of the Sino-Soviet dispute by experts 
have also been perused with the idea of obtaining a consensus, or diver-
gence, conce:r,ning the issue. In addition, the authors of these studies 
usually have had access to information in Communist newspapers, as well 
as the language proficiency to read them. Articles in professional jour-
nals were particularly helpful on specific problems not thoroughly dis-
cussed in comprehensive works. The basic difficulty in studying the 
Communist bloc rests, of course, on the interpretation of primary sources, 
which are phrased in Marxist-Leninist terms. One must put oneself in a 
particular perspective to unravel the thread of reality running through 
the cliches and polemics. 
CHAPTER II 
LEGACY OF RUSSIAN EASTERN POLICY 
In the nineteenth century diplomats made allowances for cultural 
differences between nations. Even though the French and the English 
might cooperate, there was never much thought that one should adopt the 
other's style of government. It was not even conceivable by the English 
that perhaps the French might remedy their chronic political ills by 
imitation of the stable English Parliament. However, in the modern era 
of ideological proselytism and de-colonization, the exportation of par-
liamentary government, "democracy," or Marxism-Leninism has become stan-
dard. Often forgotten in this mass exportation is the fact that govern-
ments are a. reflection of the cultural fabric of a nation. As such, 
export is impossible because of the basic cultural differences between 
nations. This is often forgotten, too, in discussions of the Sino-Soviet 
dispute. Both nations are possessors of long and proud civilizations 
which no ideology acquired over a few years can obliterate. There re-
mains a cultural heritage which has become an irritation in the present 
conflict. This cultural incompatibility became apparent, and signifi-
cant, only after the initial fervor of ideology faded. Thus, age-old 
national interests and old antagonisms have again asserted themselves. 
Basic Cultural Differences Between Russia and China 




groups within nations. However, between some nations these differences 
are not primary, and can be overcome. For example, the nations of West-
ern Europe are basically compatible culturally even though there are 
marked French, German, English, or Italian characteristics. They share 
a cormnon heritage and outlook. Contrasted with this, the Russian and 
Chinese cultures are antithetical. Their cultures were shaped by differ-
ent processes and produced a completely different outlook. It has often 
been said that Russia is Eastern in a cultural sense because she was 
under Mongol rule for three centuries, was isolated from Europe, and ex-
perienced neither Reformation nor Renaissance. But it is clear that 
Russia was influenced for the greatest part by a Western, Hellenistic 
culture. The greater part of her population has always been in Western 
Russia with only fringe groups in the Oriental areas. Russia may appear 
Eastern to Europe, but to the Orient she is definitely Western. and Cau-
casian. Dostoyevsky clarified the problem of Russia: "In Europe we 
were hangers-on and slaves, whereas we shall go to Asia as masters. In 
Europe we were Asiatics, whereas in Asia we, too, are Europeans. 111 
A closer look at these cultural characteristics of Russia and China 
is enlightening, as the Communist regimes have not yet had time, es-
pecially in China, to completely reshape society. These cultural and 
social aspects form a significant part of Klaus Mehnert 9 s book, Peking 
~ Moscow, and provide valuable insight not generally considered. 
Mehnert first considers the "individual man" of Russia and China--his 
1reodor Dostoyevsky, ~ Diary of~ Writer, Vol. II, (New York, 
1949), p. 1048. 
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outlook and his attitudes. 2 He makes the point that Russian "man" and 
Chinese "man" represent exact opposites in outlook and temperament. The 
Russian puts primary emphasis upon the importance of the soul--over in-
tellect, over reason, or over material abundance. Consequently, this 
leads the Russian to excesses and fanaticism . 
The emotional and impulsive temperament of the Russian exem-
plifies, among all the people of Europe, the strongest con-
trast to the rational wisdom of the Chinese, • • • to his self-
control rising out of his continual state of harmony with his 
environment.3 
In contrast to the Russian, the Chinese attaches more importance to the 
intellectual and material aspects of life. There is exhibited a stoical 
acceptance of adversity and a joy in life, even a cynical laughter at 
almost everything . The result of these two contrasts is that the Rus-
sian tends to approach life with a grim seriousness, while the Chinese 
is more laconic and pragmatic . 
Religion is of supposedly slight importance in a Communist state; 
however, past religious attitudes have shaped present basic attitudes. 
Since the tenth century, which saw Russia's conversion to Christianity, 
the Russians have been dominated by Orthodoxy, one arm of Caesaropapism. 
The Russian is permeated with Christianity and is passionately concerned 
with an Absolute. The Russian is eschatologically oriented, rather than 
concerned with the earthly world. "The Russians are not sceptics; they 
2The question as to whether there are distinctive national charac-
teristics is a perennial and heated topic, Mehnert offers this proof: 
"The late Felix M. Keesing, the New Zealand anthropologist, summarized 
his findings in two theses: first, in the case of each nation it is 
possible to prove the existence of a certain national character which 
distinguishes it from other nations; second, this national character is 
a variable, not a constant, quantity." Klaus Mehnert, Peking and Moscow, 
(New York, 1963), p. 3. ~-
3Ibid., p. 28 . 
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are dogmatists. Among them everything takes on a religious character; 
they have little understanding of what is relative, 114 Combined with 
this passionate religious fervor, wherever it may lead, is the Russian 
attitude toward suffering. Suffering, usually for an abstract goal, this 
longing toward an Absolute, is firmly entrenched in Russian life and 
literature. Combined with their fanaticism this attitude has produced 
the Messianic outlook with its striving toward an everlasting kingdom. 
In contrast to the Russian's permeation and preoccupation with reli-
gion, the Chinese present a purely secular state, There has never 
existed in China a Messianic religion, such as Christianity or Islam, 
with its powerful impetus. Instead, there was a philosophic system with 
emphasis on materialism and preoccupation with things and relationships 
in this world. The primary importance was placed on making this life 
pleasant, with no thought of preparing for a future life, to which the 
Russian was oriented. From this emphasis on the present life and rela-
tions in it, China developed what Ruth Benedict has termed a "shame 
culture," as opposed to the Western "guilt culture." The distinction 
lies in the distinction between shame and guilt: "shame is the disgrace 
we are conscious of in the eyes of others, and guilt is what we feel in-
wardly.115 The sense of wrong-doing in a "shame culture" depends on other 
people--whether you were observed--and thus guilt is entirely relative. 
Contrasted to this are the absolutist tenets of Christianity with which 
Russian culture is permeated. One might say particularly that the Rus-
sians are permeated by this guilt complex. Thus, attitude toward 
4Nicholas Berdyaev, ~ Russian Idea, (New York, 1948), p . 27, 
5Gerhard Piers and Milton B. Singer, Shame and Guilt, (Springfield, 
Illinois, 1953), p. so. 
~ 
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religion, with its effect on culture, presents a major dichotomy in Rus-
sian and Chinese cultures. 
In Russia the atheism of Communism's founders forced this religious-
ly-dominated society to make an either/or choice. The degree of intensi-
ty of belief presented a real obstacle to Communism. Contrasted with 
this situation is China, which never experienced a great religious force, 
Communism appears as just one more philosophy or way of life which will 
be absorbed and Sinif~ed, 
Part of the cultural differences arising between Russia and China 
is racism. 
In China and Russia we have two very different peoples. One 
nation consists of men and women with what we call yellow 
skins, the other mainly of people whose skin colors we loosely 
lump together as white . Both are proud peoples and each has 
within its tradition ideas of racial and national superiority 
which are in their nature mutually incompatible,6 
Russian superiority has traditionally been expressed in the Third Rome 
concept, which originated in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and 
the later, related Pan-Slav movement of the nineteenth century. China 
has traditionally considered herself as the "center of the world" with 
all non-Chinese being inferior barbarians who had to pay tribute to the 
Middle Kingdom and acknowledge its superiority, In Russia, religion, 
and in China, culture became intertwined with politics. Racism is rarely 
mentioned by the Russians or the Chinese, and then only discreetly. 
Therefore, discussion on this subject must be speculated upon almost 
exclusively by outsiders. A few revealing comments indicate that these 
speculations are based on a genuine issue. 
One of the most revealing illustrations of the existence of racism 
6 Schwarz, ~arry, Tsars ~Mandarins, (New York, 1964), p. 20 . 
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in Sino-Soviet relations occurred at the Conference of Asian and African 
States, held at Bandung, Indonesia in April 1955. The Soviet Union was 
either not invited or excluded from coming, all at the insistence of the 
Chinese. Again, at the Afro-Asian Solidarity Meeting, held at Moshi, 
Tanganyika in February 1963, the Soviet delegates' right to participate 
was questioned from the very beginning of the meeting on the grounds 
that as Europeans they had no business at an Afro-Asian meeting, 
Without naming the Chinese directly, a Soviet commentator 
writing in the spring of 1963 described the Chinese policy 
/at this conference/: Some of the more chauvinistically-
minded leaders would like to direct the solidarity movement 
not against imperialism, colonialism, and its agents, but 
against all white people. 7 
At this same meeting "The Chinese called the delegates from Soviet areas 
in Asia 'marionettes of white imperialists. 1118 In addition, the Soviets 
have pointed out the racist implications of the favorite Chinese slogan 
"The wind from the East will prevail over the wind from the West. 119 
There is another side to be investigated. The use of racism by the 
Chinese may be considered as an employment of ideology, In the movement 
to gain influence over newly-emancipated countries the appeal of race is 
strong due to the colonial legacy. The Chinese can easily employ racism 
in these areas, appealing to strong anti-European sentiments, 
Clearly, the Chinese use the slogan 'Colored People Unite' 
as an argument in situations, but that is only one weapon 
in their armory. They are as ready to accept the allegiance 
of militant leftist whites, ••• as they are of non-whites. 10 
7 Ibid, , p. 192. 
8Ibid., p. 199. 
9Michael Freeberne, "Racial Issues and the Sino-Soviet Dispute," 
Asian Survey, 5(1965), p. 413. 
10 Schwarz, p. 237. 
12 
The Chinese have styled themselves as the leaders of African, Asian, and 
Latin American Communist movements, while relegating North America and 
Europe to the Soviet sphere of influence. However, the Soviet Union 
will not acquiesce to this so easily. 
There is, however, one problem in China's racist arguments. This 
is the problem of the Overseas Chinese who are spread through much of 
Southeast Asia. These Chinese have become merchants, money lenders, and 
industrialists through frugality and shrewdness, evoking envy and hatred 
among the native populations. Overseas Chinese are very clannish; they 
make no attempt to assimilate into the native society and often retain 
their Chinese citizenship . This makes them suspect to the native popu-
lation who think of the Chinese in their midst as a "fifth column" for 
the largest country in Asia . The Asian countries are not quite sure 
whether to trust their "big brother" who is looking out for their wel-
fare. The Overseas Chinese themselves are naturally put in a difficult 
position. Most of them are from the Mainland, but they could not accept 
the restrictions there on free enterprise, yet they have no real ties to 
the government on Formosa, and the people of their country of residence 
hate and distrust them. Their position is analogous to that of the 
Indians in Africa. Time and nationalism will decide their fate, and 
their passports. Meanwhile, the Communist Chinese prefer not to empha-
size the existence of the Overseas Chinese. As Harry Schwarz has stated: 
The point is worth repeating: the Chinese will use racism 
when it suits their purposes; they will eschew racism when 
such action better suits their needs. And even if the Chinese 
in the future go over to a completely racist line, they will 
have no easy time convincing millions of Asians that Peking 
stands for the welfare of all non-whites, rather than for the 
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welfare of China.11 
In summary, there exist certain national antagonisms which stem 
from two sources--traditional. cultural differences and racial prejudice. 
The traditional attitudes toward racism have been coupled with the anti-
white colonial legacy and exploited for propaganda purposes. The goal 
of this propaganda has been to increase the prestige and influence of 
China. Racism appears as a background element to be employed at the 
proper time and place. 
The Legacy of Russian Foreign Policy 
As a popular saying goes--behind the Sino-Soviet conflict lie a 
thousand years of history. No state can completely escape its history, 
irrespective of which ideology it embraces. 12 Evidences of conflicting 
interests in Sino-Soviet party relations in the period before the Chinese 
Communist takeover in 1949 are numerous. During this period Stalin's 
ambivalent policy toward the Chinese Communist Party resulted at one 
time in its near-annihilation. Soviet policies in the 1920's, combined 
with Tsarist activities in the Far East, present a long history of 
11Ibid., p. 238. 
12The debate over the influence of the past on present Soviet for-
eign policy is a recurring one occupying Russian scholars. Some as 
Michael ~arpovich and David Dallin, say that past policies were wiped 
out with the Bolshevik revolution, Others, as George Vernadsky, H. W. 
Chamberlin, and B. H. Sumner, say that Soviet foreign policy is greatly 
concerned with the same problems which plagued the Tsars. A middle 
course between these two positions appears the most valid: The Soviets 
have to contend with the same geographical, cultural, and resource prob-
lems of the Tsars; but they have at their disposal a more inclusive weap-
on than Pan-Slavism--Marxist-Leninist ideology, which provides a much 
better justification for their foreign policy. Similarly with respect to 
China, c. P. Fitzgerald, among others, makes the point in his book, The 
Chinese View of Their Place in the World, that China once again thin~ 
of herseITasthe ticentre oftheworld'r as in Manchu days. 
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Sino-Soviet suspicions. 
A more tangible legacy is the existence of the twenty-seven hundred 
mile border between China and Russia, which has never been completely 
defined. 13 Such a long border presents an almost inevitable problem. 
In addition, this borderland area presents special problems due to the 
racial and ethnic composition of the people and its sparsely inhabited 
areas. That the border dispute still exists may be seen by the heavily 
fortified borders and by recent actual clashes between the Chinese and 
the Russians. "In the spring of 1961 it was announced that in Soviet 
Kazakhastan Volunteer People's Militia Units of the Border Areas had been 
organized to guard the frontier. The only frontier there is the one 
with China. 1114 
The most constant feature of Russian and Soviet foreign policy has 
been the geography of the state. While governments change and people 
move the land remains the same. Geography has produced the most charac-
teristic feature of Russian foreign policy--expansion for defense. 
The USSR is composed of horizontal bands extending from east to west 
13110fficial maps and atlases continue to differ on some internation-
al boundaries. In some cases the difference in Chinese and Soviet maps 
is sixty or seventy miles." There are three main areas of disagreement: 
l, the area of the Pamir highlands (north of Kashmir); 
2. in the Gobi Desert; 
3. in the region where the Amur and Ussuri Rivers converge. 
"Soviet atlases, including some published in recent months, trace the 
Chinese-Mongolian Frontier in fine detail, giving the impression of an 
accurate, on-the-spot delimitation. Chinese maps depict the frontier in 
roughly sketched outline, labeling it with the notation 'undemarcated.'" 
New York Times, February 26, 1961, p. 7. 
'rrom"'the last statement, one may deduce that as far as the Russians are 
concerned, the boundary is settled, while the Chinese appear to be 
interested in changing it. 
14 Mehnert, p. 272. 
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across the country, from Leningrad to Vladivostok. These bands consist 
of the tundra in the far north, the forest area on a level with Moscow, 
the steppe (g!'eat plain) zone at the level of Kiev, and the desert re-
gions in the southernmost region. These four main regions spanning from 
west to east have always simplified migration and invasion, and later 
colonization. This occurred because the land is the same in the east, 
at the same latitude, as in the west. "With most of its territory a vast 
plain, Russia lacked natural frontiers. It was always vulnerable to land 
invasion."15 This has traditionally given Russia a war-minded outlook--
she has always had to be on the defensive against invaders. The gap be-
tween the Ural Mountains and the Caspian Sea made the southern route the 
most travelled and eventualiy forced the movement of the capital from 
medieval Kiev to Moscow, which was farther north and more protected. 
This marked the beginnings of modern Russia. 
Later the invasion of Russia took a different route. The European 
invaders came, three times in the last century alone, through Poland and 
E;astern Eu?'ope. This open invasion route naturally fo?'ced the Russians 
to concentrate on this area in defense of their state. In the past Rus-
sia has felt it necessary to control this area in order to prevent fur-
ther invasion. Now the Soviet state has gained control of the foreign 
invasion route which the Russians sought in order to defend their nation-
al security. 
The Russian state has been constantly expanding. From the days 
when Russia was the small duchy of Muscovy in the sixteenth century to 
its growth into the vast colonial empire of the nineteenth and twentieth 
15William Henry Chamberlin, The Russian Enigma, (New·Yol'k, 1944), 
p. 9. . 
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centuries, Russia has sought expansion on land. Why has this been? Due 
to the lack of natural bo~daries and the openness of the Russian plain, 
Russia's only defense against invaders has been to expand and envelop 
the area surrounding her until natural or human barriers were encounter-
ed, in order to put as much territory as possible between the center of 
the state and hostile peoples. This expansion, a basic characteristic 
of Russian foreign policy, is an expansion for defense motivated by an 
instinctive reaction to previous invasions. 
The Russian policy of expansion for defense was also manifested in 
its eastward moves in Asia. After the emergence of the Duchy of Muscovy 
fl'om the Mongol yoke in the late sixteenth century, Russia began its ex-
pansion under Ivan III. At the end of his rule in 1584 Russia encompass-
ed much of what is now European Russia. Russian policy to the east con-
sisted of expansion over sparsely inhabited and largely unclaimed lands 
until a natural or population boundary was reached. As there were no 
natural boundaries, the limit of expansion was the Pacific Ocean. The 
peoples which Russia encountered were nomadic tribes whose defenders 
were no match for the relatively powerful Russian state. Hence, Russia's 
expansion to. the east was virtually uncurbed in the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries. 
During this same period of Russian expansion there existed in China 
a strong state which was also expanding. In 1644 invaders from Manchuria 
had established the Manchu or Ch'ing Dynasty. This dynasty brought China 
again to its past power, giving traditional China her last great glory. 
Between these two powerful and expanding empires lay thousands of miles 
of barren land, largely uninhabited and unclaimed. This bordel"land 
formed a buffer zone between Russia and China which was effective until 
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the middle of the eighteenth century. At this time the two expanding 
empires collided. From the initial contact a pattern developed which 
contains the essence of Russo-Chinese relations. As long as China re-
mained a powerful state, Russia did not attempt further gains into the 
borderlands. When signs of weakness appeared in China, Russia pushed 
into the border areas. For example, in the 1840 1s the Opium War between 
China and England demonstrated China's interior weakness. It was after 
this. in the 1840-1860 period, that Russia's gains were made in the 
borderlands. Thus, Russo-Chinese relations throughout the centuries have 
been a reflection of China's strength or weakness. "The politics of the 
northern borderlands of China are based, essentially, upon relative 
power.016 
Russia's interest in Asia is also dependent on her position in 
Europe. "It becomes a law in Russian history that every time Russia 
finds herself checked in Europe she intensifies her drive in Asia."17 
For example, in the period covering the reign of Catherine the Great, 
the French Revolution and the consequent Napoleonic wars, Russia was too 
absorbed in European affairs to be interested in Far Eastern policy. In 
the nineteenth century, during the Pax Britannia, she pursued a vigorous 
Asian Policy. Thus we see that Russian policy in Asia has been dependent 
on China's relative power and upon Russia's fox,tunes in Ewope. This 
has been constant since the eax,ly days of the Russian state, and contin-
ues to be true of the Soviet state. 
16Howax,d L. Boorman, "The Borderlands and the Sino-Soviet Alliance," 
Moscow-Peking.Axis, ed. Howard L. Boorman (New York, 1957), p. 196. -------
17Prince Andrei Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia and ~ (New York, 1933), 
p. 147 0 
18 
Sino-Soviet Relations, 1917-1950 
When the Bolsheviks seized power in 1917 they constituted a tiny 
minority of the population. Their power was limited to European Russia. 
In the fringe areas of the Russian empire there was no central contro . :J. 
and many of the minority groups took this opportunity to seek independ-
ence from Russia. "The eastern regions of European Russia and the whole 
of Siberia were controlled by anti-Soviet regimes. 1118 Out of this chaos 
the Civil War began and forced the Bolsheviks to reconquer the Russian 
Empire. In relation to the eastern empire the Bolsheviks were soon con-
fronted with the dilemma Soviet Russia has faced ever since: The Bolshe-
viks were heirs to the Tsars, and as such commanded a huge state whose 
imperialistic policies had won important and strategic gains, yet they 
were purveyors of an ideology which called for world revolution of the 
.. -· ... 
oppressed and downtrodden. The solution has varied with the circum-
stances. In most circumstances, however, the Bolsheviks were not bound 
by their ideology. In fact, they have now completed a full circle and 
are legitimating the Tsarist conquests which they originally repudi-
ated.19 
The initial policy the Bolsheviks followed toward China was dictated 
by necessity. They were by no means strong enough to control the vast 
reaches of Siberia and the Russo-Chinese borderlands; in fact, they did 
not control them at all. "Thus there were no initial barriel"s to a flow 
of public statements and declarations projecting an image of 
18David J. Dallin, The Rise of Russia in Asia (New Haven, 1949), 
p. 159. --- --
19Lovell R. Tillett, "Soviet Second Thoughts on Tsarist Colonial-
ism 1 11 Foreign Affairs 4 2 ( l 964), pp. 3 07-319. 
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revolutionary fervor, idealism and zeal for justice and equality. 11 20 
The Soviet policy became one of repudiation of the Tsarist conquests in 
the Far East. It is best clarified by looking at the statement to the 
Chinese nation made by Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Leo 
Karakhan, issued July 25, 1919: 
The Soviet Government has renounced the conquests made by the 
Tsarist Government which deprived China of Manchuria and other 
areas. Let the peoples living in those areas themselves de-
cide within the frontiers of which State they wish to dwell, 
and what form of government they wish to establish in their 
own countries.21 
The rest of the document renounced all the special privileges and terri-
tories which Tsarist Russia had extracted from China. In August 1919 a 
similar statement was made with regard to Outer Mongolia, declaring that 
"Mongolia now becomes an independent country and has the right to con-
tact independently all other peoples without any guardianship whatsoever 
on the part of Peking or Petrograd. 11 22 
Almost as soon as these noble sentiments were voiced, however, fast-
moving events made them obsolete.23 As soon as the Bolsheviks felt their 
power to be growing they took steps to reconquer the Tsarist empire. The 
first step in reconquest was Outer Mongolia. In 1919, when the Bolshevik 
20schwarz, p. 93. 
21Karakhan Manifesto, In Allen S. Whiting, Soviet Policies in China 
1917-1924 (New York, 1954), p. 270. 
22The Soviet Government's Declaration to the Mongolian People and 
to the Government of Autonomous Mongolia, August 1919. In Xenia Eudin 
and Robert North, Soviet Russia~~~ 1920-1927 (Stanford, 1957), 
p. 200. 
23The events were so fast-moving that the renunciation of the Chi= 
nese Eastern Railway was put into the first draft of the Karakhan Dec-
laration, but was deleted from the published version, as the Soviets 
became more powerful in Siberia. Schwarz·, p. 95. 
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weakness was greatest, the Chinese once again made Mongolia a part of 
China. This situation wa.s short-lived, for the strange Baron Sternberg 
came to rule briefly in 1920-21, His dream of being a new Attila was, 
alas, only a preparation for renewed Russian control. In March 1921 the 
Provisional Revolutionary Government of Mongolia was proclaimed. It 
immediately asked for Soviet aid and a Soviet-Mongolian Treaty was signed 
in November 1921, giving Russia certain concessions, When this secret 
treaty was discovered, the Chinese accused the Soviets of Tsarist tactics. 
"Such action on the part of the Soviet Government is similar to the poli-
cy the former Imperial Russian Government assumed toward China. 1124 The 
Mongolian incident marked the re-emergence of Russia in Asia and was a 
portent of future Soviet policy in the East. 
Soviet policy in the 1920vs toward China was a dual policy of open 
diplomacy with the Nationalist Chinese Government and revolutionary sub-
version via the Chinese Communist Party. The first was pursued by a 
Sino-Soviet Treaty concluded in 1924 by Leo Karakhan with the Peking 
Government. It provided for joint administration of the Chinese Eastern 
Railway and the preservation of a dominant Russian influence in Outer 
Mongolia. The revolutionary goal of the Soviet policy in China--a Com-
munist China--was pursued along two lines. The first of these was the 
creation in 1921-22 of a Chinese Communist Party subject to the tight 
discipline and direction of the Communist International in Moscow, As 
the Communist Party in China had only a few hundred memberst all un-
trained, a more feasible policy was necessary. The more reasonable 
policy consisted of encouragement to Sun Yat-sen's Kuomintang, which was 
24Note from the Chinese Foreign Minister to Russian Minister Paikes, 
In Dallin, ~' p, 192. 
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a nationalistic, non-Mar,t.ist, middle-class organization, and had ma.ny 
more adherents than the tiny Communist Party. Stalin's dual policy con-
sisted of directing the CCP• while giving material support to the 
Kuomintang. It was also the particular application of Lenin's theses on 
the National and Colonial Question, adopted by the Comintern in mid-1920. 
Lenin urged that in backward countries Communists should not hesitate to 
support any revolutionary liberation movements which aimed at the over-
throw of landowners and other feudal institutions. 
The Communist International must be ready to establish tem-
porary relationships and even alliance with the bourgeois 
democracy of the colonies and backward countries. It must 
not, however, amalgamate with 'it. It must retain the inde-
pendent character of the proletarian movement~ even though 
this movement be in the embryonic stage •••• 5 
So, the CCP was supposed to work with the Kuomintang until it grew strong 
enough to assume power of its own and overthrow the Kuomintang. This 
cunning tactic: of Lenin's, however, backfired in China and it was Chiang 
l<ai-shek who outmaneuvered Stalin. 
The period of 1924-1927 has been called by David Dallin the "Rus-
sian Period" in Chinese affairs. 26 At this time Russian influence in 
China was tremendous and the CCP was subservient to the Comintern. In-
deed, it was this total subservience to Stal.in which accounted for its 
disaster of 1926-27. In 1923 Stalin had called for a tactical alliance 
with the Kuomintang. After some hesitat!.on Sun Yat-sen, as leade?' of the 
Kuomintang, accepted the Communists into his party as "individuals," only 
on the condition tha.t they would submit to the Kuomintang and ?'ecognize 
25Exce?'pt From the Theses on the National and Colonial Questions. 
In Eudin and North, p. 65. 
26nallin, Rise, pp. 200-216. 
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no party outside of it. 27 The Joint Sun-Joffe Declaration in 1923 also 
marks the beginning of the Trotsky-Stalin disagreements on China policy. 
The split between them had already occurred and was fully expressed in 
the arguments over China policy. Trotsky favored a pure, if small, Com-
munist Party unaligned with the Kuomintang, while Stalin favored collabor-
ation. So, Soviet policy in the period 192+-27 stipulated alliance of 
the CCP with the Kuomintang in an effort to overthrow the imperialists. 
Toward this end the Soviet Union supported the Kuomintang materially, as 
well as politically, first under Sun Yat-sen, then under Chiang Kai-shek. 
Relations between Chaing and Michael Borodin, the Russian advisor in 
China, were very close, and the Kuomintang was officially a sympathizer 
in the Comintern. 
Chiang, however, was under no illusions about Stalin's plans to use 
him and cast him aside like a "squeezed lemon," He knew that the long-
range aim of the Communist members of the Kuomintang was to gain control 
of the party. He was determined to prevent this. In the meantime he 
needed Soviet aid. On Ms.rc.h 20, 1926 he launched a coup against the 
Communists in Canton. He arrested Communist leaders while retaining 
power for himself and apologizing to Moscow, Still the Comintern urged 
oollaboratidn with the Kuomintang even though Chiang had barred Commu-
nists from top posts of leadership in the Kuomintang. Only after the 
reign of terror launched by Chiang April 12, 1927 in Shanghai and Nanking, 
in which thousands of Communists were executed, did Moscow realize the 
need for a change in China policy. Stalin's policy of collaboration had 
ended in dismal failureo He had been proved wrong, and Russian influence 
27Benjamin Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise ~ ~ 
(Cambridge, 1951), p. 40. 
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in China had been proved inept. The failure of Soviet policy can only 
be attributed to sheer ignorance of the local situation and a d9gmatic 
insistence on continuing the collaboration policy. 28 The nadir of Sino-
Soviet relations was the 1927 raid on the Soviet Embassy in Peking and 
the departure for Moscow of the Soviet Minister, Michael Borodin, in 
July 1927. Diplomatic ties between Russia and China were severed, and 
the "Russian Period" was quite obviously ended when armed clashes over 
the Chinese Eastern Railway occurred in 1929 between. Soviet troops and 
troops of Chang Tso-lin, the Manchurian warlord. The Soviet Union then 
concentrated attention on the revolutionary aspect of her Chinese policy. 
The new directives of the Comintern repudiated alliance with the Kuomin-
tang, and urged the establishment of soviets in China. 
Soviet foreign policy in the 1930 1 s in the Far East was marked by 
antagonism with Japan over Chinese territories, primarily Manchuria, and 
the larger threat of Japanese hegemony in the East . During the entire 
period from 1931- 1937 both the Soviet Union and China attempted to estab-
lish peace·ful relations with Japan, because neither state was in any con-
dition to wage war. Alternatively, Japan was under a military govern-
ment, ready to expand . Chiang was the recognized leader of the Nanking 
Government, but still had to face the two problems of the Communists in 
the northern hills and rebellious warlords . His policy was to simply 
stall for time against Japan until he could build up his army. The 
Soviet Union was sandwiched between two fronts--Germany and Japan--and 
28Benjamin Schwartz and Conrad Brandt contend that Stalin was forced 
to continue the collaboration policy primarily because Trotsky took the 
opposite view. By 1928 Stalin had triumphed over Trotsky and could re-
verse Comintern policies in China. See Schwartz, Chinese Communism and 
the Rise of Mao, and Conrad Brandt, Stalin's Failure in China 1924-1927 
(Cambridge';- 1958). 
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was also having internal convulsions. In the prewar period the Soviet 
Union was provoked several times by Japan. 29 In all cases she was forced 
to submit to most of Japan's claims, because of China's inability to de-
fend herself. "It was not only the total collapse of Chinese resistence 
that made the Soviets regard as imperative an adjustment of their differ-
ences with Japan; the situation in Europe also impelled them toward a 
settlement. 1130 The proclamation of the existence of Manchukuo only led 
to the selling of the Chinese Eastern Railway; the border incidents re-
mained unsettled and were aggravated further in 1936; and Japanese pene-
tration of China proper was condoned in Tsiantao, Russian efforts to 
placate Japan were climaxed by the 1941 Soviet-,Japanese Neutrality Pact. 
In China Russia continued to support Chiang Kai-shek, as Chinese 
unity was essential to stop Japan in China. Consequently the United 
Front was formed between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang 
in December 1936. The Soviet Union then supported the Kuomintang-Commu-
nist Front with credits of $250 million in an effort to stop Japan before 
she penetrated the Soviet Union, 31 At the very same time, Russia was 
carrying on rather dubious activities in the Chinese borderland areas. 
Soviet conciliatory efforts toward Japan could be interpreted as a Soviet 
desire for a "weak China," until Russia obtained certain border areas. 
Strong support for this idea can be seen in the Sovietizing of Mongolia 
in 1924, of Tannu Tuva in 1939, the construction of the Turk-Sib railway, 
29see Harriet L. Moore, Soviet Far Eastern Policy 1931-1945, 
(Princeton, 1945), for a discussion of the Chinese Eastern Railway dis-
pute, the frontier dispute, and the fisheries dispute. 
30Moore, p . 31. 
31Harold H. Fisher, "Soviet Policies in Asia," American Academy of 
Political and Social , Sciences, 263(1949), p. 199. 
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Roosevelt. Due to American lack of information on actual Japanese 
strength, Russian participation in the war seemed urgent. Consequently, 
in the negotiations Stalin possessed an advantage which he did not hesi-
tate to use. He went into the Conference with three primary demands 
which essentially meant the Soviet Union was to inherit all of Japan's 
rights in the Far East and to further strengthen her ties with Mongo.-
lia. 34 ln relation to China this meant Japan's rights in the Liaotang 
Peninsula and a restoration of Russian influence in Manchuria. "China 
was clearly being made to pay the heavy price of Soviet participation in 
the war . 11 35 
The KMT-CCP United Front had been an uneasy armed truce since its 
inception, but it gave the Chinese Communists another chance to capture 
China. The soviets which had been established by Mao were the base of 
Communist power and the Red Army was its instrument, Sanctioned by the 
war effort the Communists gradually expanded their area of control over 
North China, which was a vacuum of authority. Along with their military 
advance the Communists directed a process of popular mobilization of the 
peasants. By the end of the war the Communists had vastly increased in 
numbers, as well as the area they controlled. With victory over Japan 
the United Front disintegrated and civil war was resumed, in spite of 
American efforts to seek a settlement. In the next four years the Com-
munists, who were fighting a guerrilla war, had the advantage. They had 
no government to support, no economic problems plaguing their country, 
and finally they had a disciplined army with strong peasant support. 
34Ibid., p. 192. Also see The Yalta Agreement concerning China in 
H. Wei, China and Soviet Russia (New York, 1956), p. 332, 
35Ibid., p. 193. 
Innumerable factors undid the Nationalist forces: going 
against American advice. they became overextended; the mili-
tary under Chiang were out of civilian economic control and 
never established a sound economic base; a postwar American-
style military reorganization produced confusion; the Whampoa 
clique discriminated against provincial commanders and armies, 
particularly those of Kwangsi, ••• Corruptionl demoralization 
and desertion steadily depleted their armies.;j6 
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The disillusionment of many of the Nationalists 9 the Communists claim. 
was a large factor in the loss of the war. 37 The CCP seemed to possess 
the "Mandate of Heaven." 
Russian participation in the CCP bid for power was, at best, of a 
supporting nature. The Soviet Union contributed material aid only indi-
rectly through the KMT 9 and its Moscow-trained Chinese Marxist-Leninists 9 
the "Returned Students." were overthrown in their bid for leadership by 
Mao's peasant- based movement. The Chinese Communist Party's victory in 
1949 was essentially a product of its own efforts. This is the most 
vital point that emerges from the Communist victory. Always China 
assumed the role of a buffer state between the Soviet Union and Japan. 
Once Japan was defeated, China assumed importance as an ally in the East. 
further cemented by the fact that both states followed the same ideology, 
36John King Fairbank, ~Asia The Modern Transformation (Boston. 
1965), p. 859, 
37110f 550,000 Nationalists lost, the Communists claimed 327 9 000 
surrendered." Ibid •• p. 860. 
CHAPTER III 
GENESIS OF THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE 
The Chinese People's Republic was proclaimed by Mao Tse-tung on 
October 1, 1949 following the defeat and expulsion from the mainland of 
Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang forces. Shortly after the establishment of 
the Chinese Communist state Mao went to Moscow for a nine-week period of 
negotiations. The result of these negotiations betw~en Mao and Stalin 
was the Sino-Soviet alliance announced on February 14_, 1950. , 
The Sino-Soviet Alliance 
The alliance was based on three separate agreements. The first of 
these was the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual As-
sistance, the basic foundation of the new alliance. It is valid until 
1980 and may be further extended by mutual consent. This first agree-
ment was primarily directed against Japan. China and the USSR agreed to 
take all necessary measures to prevent the resumption of aggression on 
the part of Japan "or any other state allied with her." It was also 
agreed that neither Contracting Party was "to take part in any coalition 
or in any actions or measures directed against the other." They will 
also "consult with each other in regard to all important problems affect-
ing the common ,interests of China and the Soviet Union." It was also 
agreed to "respect the national sovereignty and territorial integrity 
and non-interference in the internal affairs of the other" as well as to 
28 
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"render to the other all possible economic assistance and to carry out 
necessary economic cooperation."l 
The second agreement dealt with the respective rights of the Rus-
sians and the Chinese in Manchuria, the major border area in which both 
have interests, and over which there has been traditional rivalry between 
the two states. This agreement provided that the Chinese Changchun Rail-
way would be transferred without compensation from the Soviets to the 
Chinese. However, this would not come into effect until 1952 or upon 
the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan, whichever came earlier . 
"Pending the transfer, the existing Sino-Soviet joint administration of 
the Railway shall remain unchanged." Further, the naval base, Port 
Arthur, would also continue to be "jointly used,'' with Russian troops 
garrisoned there, and would be employed to support joint military opera-
tions in the event of war with Japan or any country allied with Japan. 
This arrangement would also be terminated in 1952 or at the conclusion 
of a pe~ce treaty with Japan. The administration of Dairen (Dalny), the 
principal port at the southern end of the Chinese Changchun Railway, was 
confirmed as belonging entirely to the Chinese. 2 
The third agreement outlined forthcoming economic aid from the 
Soviet Union to China. It stipulated that China would receive credits 
of US$300 million, to be made available to China each year, China was 
to repay the loan in ten equal annual installments beginning in 1954 and 
1Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance. In Wei, pp. 
344-5. 
2 Agreement on the Chinese Chanchun Railway, Port Arthur and Dalny. 
Ibid,, pp. 345-6, 
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culminating in 1963. 3 The primary purpose of the loan was to finance 
the delivery of Soviet heavy industry goods to China. 
At this same time the Soviet and Chinese governments exchanged notes 
on two other matters. One of these nullified the August 14, 1945 treaty 
between the Soviet Union and the Nationalist Government of China. The 
other note guaranteed the independent status of the Mongolian People's 
Republic (Outer Mongolia). In addition to these agreements announced in 
February 1950, the Sino-Soviet alliance was amplified further by addi-
tional agreements signed in the spring of 1950. 
These p~ovided for the establishment of a network of Sino-
Soviet joint-stock companies to operate in the borderland 
areas of China: Two companies to undertake the exploita-
tion of non-ferrous and rare minerals, and petroleum in 
Sinkiang, ••• ; a civil aviation company to operate flights 
between Peking and the Soviet Union via Manchuria, Outer 
Mongolia, and Sinkiang; a company to build and repair ships 
at Dairen, •••• And in the spring of 1950, the two Com-
munist allies completed initial negotiations on trading 
arrangements, under which the Soviet Union was to supply 
industrial equipment while Communist China would, in re-
turn, export raw materials.4 
These spring agreements completed the forging of the Sino-Soviet alli-
ance. The two largest Communist nations were now bound together by 
political ties, by economic ties, and by joint business enterprises. In 
spite of these agreements which appeared to cement relations between the 
two countries, differences developed, first into an ideological dispute 
and subsequently into a divergence of policy which has threatened the 
alliance itself. 
The existence of a Sino-Soviet dispute was formally acknowledged by 
3Ibid., pp. 346-6. 
4Howard L. Boorman, "The Sino-Soviet Alliance: The Political Im-
pact,'' Boorman, p. 9. 
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both sides in December, 1962. 5 Before this public announcement the dif-
ferences had been raging in secrecy since at least 1958. 6 But even 
before 1958, or 1956, there were seeds of conflict which were present 
after the promulgation of the alliance in 1950. In order to accurately 
trace the development of the conflict, it is necessary to look first at 
Sino-Soviet relations in the years between the signing of the agreements 
in 1950 and the year of serious disagreement, 1956. 
Sino-Soviet Relations, 1950-1956 
Due to certain historical and geographical factors, there had been 
some doubt concerning the strength of the Sino-Soviet alliance from its 
inception. As G. F. Hudson puts it: "Ever since the Chinese Communists 
set up their government in Peking in 1949 and promptly concluded a treaty 
of military alliance with the Soviet Union, there has been speculation 
in the West about the reality and durability of the Sino-Soviet partner-
ship.117 For the first six years, however, there were no outward signs 
of dissension, although there might have been some disharmony. 
This remarkable degree of harmony in the earlier period of the al-
liance may be explained in terms other than genuine agreement. As is 
normal with any new state, there is a period of adjustment a new govern-
ment must make. The period of adjustment is characterized by attention 
5Edward Crankshaw, ~~~~--Moscow v. Peking (Baltimore, 
1963), p. a. 
6crankshaw says that Khrushchev gave 1959 as the beginning date, 
when he charged that the Chinese first began violating the Moscow Dec-
laration of 1957. However, the Chinese themselves say it began in 1956, 
the year of the Twentieth Party Congress and Khrushchev's secr~t speech 
denouncing Stalin. Ibid., p . 23. 
7G. F. Hudso~, ~ Sino-Soviet Dispute (New York, 1961), p. 1. 
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to internal matters, with a great deal less emphasis placed on foreign 
relations. This is necessary in order that the new government may estab-
lish itself and consolidate its power. In the case of China this period 
of internal adjustment was complicated by the Korean War which broke out 
in mid-1950. 
From 1950 through 1952, the government in Peking was in the 
difficult position of having to push through its initial 
programs of political unification and economic rehabilita-
tion at home, while at the same time deeply involved in a 
costly and risky military engagement in Korea ,8 
However, this military engagement was helpful in many respects to China. 
The presence of an external enemy provides a government with an opportu-
nity to consolidate its support, mobilize its resources, and put down 
any internal opposition. The Korean War provided such an external enemy 
against whom the Chinese government could rally the people. In addition 
to obtaining for China domestic consensus and support, the Korean War 
served to test the six-month-old Sino-Soviet alliance. G. F. Hudson 
says of the Korean War: 
Above all, the Korean War brought Russia and China together; 
both had the strongest common interest in preventing the 
overthrow of the Communist regime in North Korea after the 
failure of its attack on the South, and while China put in 
an army to fight against the United Nations forces, Russia 
provided arms and equipment and the threat of intervention 
if the war should be extended to Chinese territory.9 
However, Howard Boorman suggests that sometimes the cooperation between 
Russia and China seemed a bit less than perfect. 
At times, Russian and Chinese moves seemed perfectly timed 
to present a common Communist front. Yet there were instances 
in the United Nations negotiations wh.ere, it would appear, the 
8Boorman, p. 9. 
9Hudson, p. 1. 
Russian~ failed to take complete advantage of tactical oppor-
tunities favorable to them and made only inconclusive gestures 
toward advancing Chinese interests.lo 
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It does seem clear, though, that the Korean War had the effect of draw-
ing the Soviets and the Chinese together to fight a common enemy, even 
if cooperation was not at a maximum, as well as to serve the Chinese 
Government by enabling it to mobi lize domestic support for the war . By 
mid-1952 the Chinese realized that not much else could be gained in 
Korea. 11 
Perhaps as a result of the threatened invasion of Manchuria the two 
allies decided that further discussions should be conducted concerning 
boundary questions . In August Chou En-lai went to Moscow where an agree-
ment was reached by September 1952 and an official communique was issued. 
The discussions dealt with unresolved points of the 1950 agreement con-
cerning the Chinese Changchun Railway and Port Arthur, The agreement 
stated that "the Soviet government was to transfer to China', with full 
title and without compensation, all Russian rights in the joint manage-
ment of the Chinese Changchun Railway and all property belo.nging to 
it. 12 This transfer was made at the end of 1952, and is significant as 
it is one of the first instances in post-1945 history when the Russians 
voluntarily relinquished territorial and economic rights once gained. 
However, in recompense, a second exchange of notes provided that Russia 
10Boorman, p. 10 
11Mr. Boorman states: "Caution suggests that the interpretation 
of the diplomatic history of the Korean War be left to the future, since 
the present evidence is as overabundant as it is incomplete." Ibid., 
p. 9. 
12Ibid., p. 10. 
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would retain her h~id on the naval base at Port Arthur,13 In addition, 
the September negotiations produced an agreement concerning Outer Monge-
lia. This agreement, however, was not made public by the Communists 
until October 1954. "The three governments ••• worked out a tripartite 
Sino-Sovi~t-Mongol agreement on the construction of a new strategic rail 
link, through the Mongolian People's Republic, to connect the rail sys-
tems of the Soviet Union and Communist China. 1114 These September agree-
ments seemed to clear up any lingering unsettled points between the two 
powers. 
The sudden death of Stalin in March 1953 marked the beginning of 
far-reaching changes in the Communist world, The long absolutist rule of 
Stalin had formed the Communist world into a monolithic structure which 
was certain to change when the absolute ruler was gone. This certain 
element of change naturally affected the Sino-Soviet alliance, As 
Boorman says: "The death of Stalin in March 1953 introduced a distinct 
note of uncertainty into the relations between the two major powers of 
the Communist bloc. 1115 This note of uncertainty was kept concealed under 
an outward facade of political and ideological unity. An appearance of 
unity was necessary after Stalin's .death, and China was willing to do 
this, as from 1950 to 1953 she had followed Moscow's dictates because of 
her economic and political dependence upon Russia. 16 Thus the succession 
of leadership in Russia brought little immediate change to the 
13Text of Chinese note, In David Floyd,~ Against Khrushchev 
(New York, 1964), p. 215. 
14B oorman, p. 11, 
15Ibid., p. 13. 
16crankshaw, p. 22. 
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Sino-Soviet alliance. 
The alliance, in fact, was strengthened by several acts of the new 
regime. "It appeared that the post-Stalin leadership in Moscow, ••• had 
concluded that the most realistic attitude was to leave no doubt of his 
/Mao's/ continuing status as the principal ally in Asia. 1117 This atti-
tude was substantiated by the appointment as ambassador of Deputy Foreign 
Minister v. v. Kuznetsov, who was higher in rank than the envoy he re-
placed . In addition, when Kuznetsov left for Peking with Chou En-lai, 
three new Sino- Soviet agreements were announced. These involved : 
A protocol on trade between Communist China and the Soviet 
Uni on for 1953, which was a routine agreement renegotiated 
annually since 1950. The second agreement was a protocol 
to the original credit agreement of February 14, 1950, The 
third was an agreement on Soviet assistance to Communist 
China in the expansion and construction of power stations .18 
As can be discerned , these agreements were indicative only of increased 
economic and techni cal assistance . The timing of them is more important 
than t heir content. Timed immediately after Staiin's death, it seems 
clear that their purpose was to assuage any doubts which had arisen con-
cerning the alliance. 
Further agreements between Russia and China continued to be nego-
tiated . In mid-October 1954 a new agreement was announced which appeared 
to further reinforce Sino-Soviet relations. The first declaration of 
these 1954 agreements affirmed that the two governments were in full 
agreement with respect to both Sino-Soviet cooperation and their atti-
tudes toward the international situation. In effect, this declaration 
17Boorman, p . 14 . 
18Ibid . , p. 15. Also consult Floyd, pp. 218 and 225 for the 
provisions. 
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pledged Sino-Soviet cooperation and coordination of policy concerning 
mutual problems, but especially problems in the Far East, and set forth 
Communist attitudes toward Indochina, Taiwan, Korea, and Southeast Asia. 
A second declaration concerned relations of the two powers with Japan, 
Other agreements were announced at this time, The Soviets agreed 
to withdraw military forces from Port Arthur and to restore it to full 
Chinese control by May 1955, They also transferred the four Sino-Soviet 
;;' .......... . 
joint stock companies established by the agreements of 1950 and 1951 to 
exclusive Chinese control, An additional agreement of scientific and 
technical cooperation was also announced , Finally, the two powers 
agreed on the construction of additional railway linkage between Sinkiang 
and the Central ·Asian .provinces of Russia.19 These October 1954 negotia-
tions revised earlier economic financial arrangements, which further in-
creased the economic assistance of Russia to China. 
The October 1954 agreements appear to have a twofold significance. 
First, they emphasized the increasing economic, scientific, and techni-
cal aid given to China by Russia, and the consequent dependence of China 
on Russia, Second, the announcement of these agreements immediately 
after Stal i n's death indicated certain political trends, They demon-
strated that both of the Communist powers were eager to present an un-
broken Communist monolith to the non-Communist world, which was apparent-
ly awaiting drastic changes in the Communist bloc. In addition, the 
political pronouncements of the agreements in which Russia pledged sup-
port of Chinese goals indicated China's rising importance and Russia's 
consequent desire to support her, As Mr . Boorman observed: "The 
19 Floyd , p , 22 0 • 
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international drives of the Chinese Communist regime ••• are greatly re-
inforced by the alliance between Peking and Moscow. 1120 It must also be 
remembered, however, that while Russia's support benefited China's goals, 
the Soviet Union, in its need for stabilization of its new regime, also 
benefited from a secure flank, so to speak . 
During 1955 and 1956 Sino-Soviet relations appeared to become more 
firmly cemented. Public pronouncements by high ranking officials of both 
states indicated support of goals pursued by the other. One example was 
the Soviet Union's support of China's right to Taiwan and to Nationalist 
China's seat in the United Nations. 21 Solidarity was further substanti-
ated by two new Sino-Soviet agreements announced on April 7, 1956. The 
first of these was an expanded program of Russian assistance for fifty-
five new Chinese industrial establishments. The second called for the 
completion by 1960 of the Lanchow-Urumchi-Alma Ata railway, which would 
link Northwest China with Soviet Central Asia by way of Sinkiang . 22 
These agreements meant a further increase of Soviet aid to China, and 
the consequent increase in involvement of the two Communist powers with 
each other. Looking at the many economic ties which held these two 
states together, in addition, of course, to the ideological ties, it be-
comes understandable why an actual split was even slower and less defi-
nite, 
20 Boorman, p . 46 , 
21Joint Soviet-Yugoslav Declaration of June 3, 1955, In Robert 
Bass and Elizabeth Marbury,~ Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy, 1948-58: 
~ Documentary Record (New York, 1959), pp. 55-60. 
22 Boorman, p. 27. 
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Seeds of the Ideological Conflict 
If a broad perspective of the Sino-Soviet conflict is taken, it may 
be said to have started with the initial relations between Mao and Stalin 
at the Second Comintern Congress of 1920. 23 However, this broad view 
serves only to illustrate the long-time strains on the Sino-Soviet alli-
ance, rather than to delineate the beginning of the present open conflict. 
It is generally considered that the first serious trouble between the 
Soviet Union and China arose in connection with the Twentieth Congress 
of the Soviet Communist Party in February 1956. 24 This was the glove 
which Khrushchev threw at Mao's feet, and which Mao picked up. 
The Twentieth Party Congress represents the major turning 
point in Sino~Soviet relations in the post-Stalin era. That 
Congress set . the stage for several of the major elements of 
conflict that have since appeared: differences over global 
strategy, over intra-bloc relations, over the pace and scope 
of de-Stalinization, over the permissible diversity of methods 
used in building socialism and Communism, and over the funda-
mental question of socialist-camp leadership.25 
The Twentieth Party Congress affected Sino-Soviet relations due to 
two speeches which Khrushchev delivered. The first of these was on 
February 14, 1956 . This speech set forth three major doctrinal modifi-
cations in Marxist-Leninist thought. The first of these new axioms was 
peaceful coexistence. Khrushchev, in essence, said that the development 
of weapons had made peaceful coexistence with the imperialists necessary. 
This -policy was justified by Khrushchev's new interpretation of the Len-
inist doctrine of the inevitability of war. : ''Lenin had argued that 
23Donald s. Zagoria, !E!:.~-Soviet Conflict 1956-1961 (Princeton, 
1962), p. 39. 
24crankshaw, p. 23. 
25zagoria, p. 40. 
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imperialist countries would quarrel among themselves over markets and 
exploitable underdeveloped territories with mounting bitterness. First 
one then another country would win a temporary advantage and the resul-
tant instability would lead inevitably to war. 11 26 But Khrushchev argued 
further that "epoch-making changes of the last decades" (i.e., since the 
outbreak of World War II) entailed that "war is not fatalistically inevi-
table." These changes were: the growth of a powerful Communist bloc, 
the existence of a large number of non-Communist countries which were 
opposed to war, the strength of the labor movement in capitalist coun-
tries, and the development of an international peace movement. Thus. on 
this new optimistic outlook, Khrushchev concluded that war between the 
imperialist states and the socialist states was not "fatalistically in-
evitable" and that peaceful coexistence was possible ideologically, as 
well as realistically. 
For in present-day conditions there is no other way out. 
Indeed, there are only two ways: either peaceful coexis-
tence or the most destructive war in history. There is 
no third way. 27 
The next doctrine Khrushchev set forth at this Congress was also an 
outgrowth of the inevitability of war doctrine. In addition to inevi-
table war between the imperialists, Lenin had also discussed the inevita-
bility of war between the imperialist and socialist countries. Lenin 
stated that the imperialists would never relinquish power voluntarily. 
Therefore, in order for socialists to gain power a violent revolution 
was necessary. This was another facet of the doctrine of inevitable war. 
26ttudson, p. 39. 
27Khrushchev 1 s Report to the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, In 
Floyd, pp. 228-231. 
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Khrushchev, however, posited that as a result of these recent "epoch-
making changes" the Communist movement was in a better position relative 
to the non-Communist world and, hence, had less need to gain power by 
violent overthrow • 
••• the weakening of capitalism relative to the growing power 
of the Communist bloc meant that it might be possible to intro-
duce Communist rule in various countries by parliamentary means 
rather than by revolutionary violence.28 
Thus, the Twentieth CPSU Congress rejected both doctrines of the inevi-
tability of war: both kinds of war are avoidable, 29 The end product of 
the rejection of both facets of the inevitability of war doctrine is 
Khrushchev's new doctrine of peaceful coexistence. 
These two interpretations which Khrushchev introduced were modifi-
cations of Marxism-Leninism and dealt with crucial tenets of Communist 
doctrine: relations with the non-Communist world and the revolutionary 
goals of Marxism-Leninism. As a result, there was much speculation in 
the non-Communist world, especially the West, that this meant a soften-
ing of Communism's goals for worldwide conquest. Looking at these inter-
pretations from a long-range perspective, it seems that they were a sort 
of updating of Marxism-Leninism. As Mr, Zagoria stated: "It could be 
argued that these doctrinal modifications represented the culmination of 
the adaption of Bolshevism to a new and unique setting--a world with 
thermo-nuclear weapons, 1130 . . . . 
In addition to the three doctrinal modifications in his speech of 
28 Ibid., p. 230, 
29Frederic s. Burin, "The Communist Doctrine of the Inevitability 
of War,"~ American Political Science Review, 57 (1963), p. 343. 
30zagoria, p. 45. 
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February 14, -Khrushchev at this time also launched the shattering de-
Stalinization campaign in his Secret Speech of February 25, 1956, in 
which he denounced the "Cult of the Individual." Khrushchev accused 
Stalin of "imposing his concepts and demanding absolute submission to 
his opinion;" of purging his opponents as "enemies of the people;" of 
committing "glaring violations of revolutionary legality;" and of ere-
ating a situation "where one could not express one's own will, 1131 This 
speech, which dragged Stalin's memory through the mud with amazing 
thoroughness and not a little crudity, produced a major crisis within 
the Soviet bloc 0 Khrushchev's speeches marked the beginning of the ide-
ological exchanges between the Soviet Union and China, exchanges which 
were to lose their ideological camouflage and envelop every area of 
Sino-Soviet relation's. 
The initial Chinese reaction to these charges against Stalin was an 
official silence, which lasted from February until April, 1956, when a 
reply was made in .:El:!!. People's Daily. 32 This article conceded that 
Stalin had made some serious mistakes, but went on to give Stalin credit 
for carrying out Lenin's principles. The Chinese contended: 
Stalin, for all his mistakes, was an outstanding Marxist-
Leninist fighter; ••• he was a figure whose contributions 
and whose errors, mostly committed in the latter part of 
his life, must be weighed against each other with a view 
to profiting from both.33 · 
The article admitted that "contradictions" were inevitable even under 
31Khrushchev 1 s Speech to the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU on The 
Cult of the Individual. In Robert V. Daniels, ed., ~ Documentary 
History~ Communism,~· 3_ (New York, 1962), pp. 225-9, 
32~ People's Daily is the official press organ of the CCP. 
33Chinese reply of April 5, 1956. In Floyd, pp. 232-235, 
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Communism and that "to deny the existence of contradictions is to deny 
dialectics. 1134 Finally the article noted that one should not deduce 
from Stalin's mistakes that leaders play unimportant roles in history. 
"To deny the role of the individual, the role of the vanguard and of the 
leaders is completely wrong. 1135 
In his discussion of the April theses Mr. Zagoria imputed four pur-
poses to the Chinese defense of Stalin: first, to limit Khrushchev's 
secret attack on Stalin so that it could not be expanded to a full-scale 
attack on the Communist system; second, to put Khrushchev's revelations 
in a theoretical context that would explain to a troubled Communist world 
how such "mistakes" could have occurred; third, to protect Mao from the 
charge that he was following in Stalin's footsteps; and finally, by put-
ting de-Stalinzation in such a context as to establish Peking as a source 
of doctrinal guidance for the entire Communist movement.36 These first 
three purposes were essentially defensive, to rationalize ·Stalin's 
crimes. The fourth purpose, however, was . a more realistic one. By put-
ting the reply in an ideological context it suggested that the Chinese 
were better Marxist-Leninists than the Russians. The natural corollary 
was that Mao should be considered the leading theoretician of the Commu-
nist world. 
The next important development in the growing dispute was the Mos-
cow Conference of November 1957, marking the fortieth anniversary of the 
October Revolution. The result of this conference was the November 22, 
34Ibid. 
35Ibid. 
36zagoria, pp. 43~6. 
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1957 Moscow Declaration, which was endorsed by twelve Communist states, 
including. Communist China.. Its primary interest was foreign policy and 
relations of the Communist bloc with the non-Communist world. The most 
important effect of the Declaration was that it endorsed Khrushchev's 
theoretical innovations of the Twentieth Party Congress. 
The Communist and Worker's Parties taking part in the meeting 
declare that the Leninist principles of peaceful co-existence 
of the two systems, which has been further developed and brought 
up to date in the decisions of the 20th Congress of the CPSU is 
the sound basis of the foreign policy of the socialist coun-
tries.37 
Thus, Khrushchev's doctrines of peaceful coexistence and peaceful tran-
sition to Communism were formally acknowledged by the thirteen Communist 
n~tions being valid. In addition the Declaration denied -that there was 
any dissension in the bloc. 
Contrary to the absurd assertions of imperialism about a 
so-called crisis of communism, the Communist movement is 
growing and gathering strength •••• The results of the 
Congresses of the Communist Parties in recent times have 
clearly demonstrated the unity and solidarity of the party 
ranks and their loyalty to the principles of proletarian 
internationalism. This meeting of the representatives of 
Communist and Worker's Parties testifies to the inter-
national solidarity of the Communist movement.38 
This Declaration was intended to preserve the outward unity of the 
Communist bloc, and possibly was an actual attempt to restore unity. It 
was of pivotal importance. It did not involve a dramatic confrontation 
between Peking and Moscow, but it did involve serious bargaining. The 
Chinese were pushing for a major, if limited, assault on the imperial-
ists, while the Russians were evidently holding back for a more cautious 
strategy. The result was a somewhat ''harder" tone as compared with the 
37Text of the Mos.cow Declaration. In Floyd, p. 248. 
38Ibid., P• 250. 
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Twentieth Party Congress· statement, but this can undoubtedly be attrib-
uted to the general worsening of the international situation between 
1956 and late 1957. 39 However, the Chinese endorsement of the Declara-
tion did represent a shift in the Chinese line from its sharp criticism 
of the April theses of the Twentieth Party Congress. The unity of the 
Communist bloc was precariously restored, but the compromise indicated 
that three later developments were probable: Peking might adapt its 
strategy to that of Moscow; Moscow might move into line with Peking; or 
the gap between the two might widen. It was this latter course that 
Sino-Soviet relations followed. 
The ideological gap widened when the Chinese Communists announced 
in August 1958 their revolutionary commune program. The commune program 
was the outward manifestation of internal struggles within the CCP. 
Sometime in the six months between June and November 1957 Chinese domes-
tic and external policy underwent a sharp leftward shift. As Mr. Zagoria 
says, this period was one of the most fateful and obscure.periods in 
recent Chinese Communist history. 40 The result, though, was clear: the 
Chinese leftist faction headed by Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing pre-
vailed and a radical program was launched. 41 The new radical program in 
external policy consisted of abandoning the cautious Bandung spirit in 
favor of a more aggressive attitude; and in domestic policy it meant the 
introduction of the commune system. 
39 Hudson, p. 41. 
40zagoria, p. 66. 
41see Roderick MacFarquhar, ''Communist China's Intra-Party Dispute," 
Pacific Affairs, 31 (1958), pp. 323-335, for a detailed study of the 
1957 struggle within the CCP. 
45 
The communal experiment was an attempt to solve China's desperate 
food and production shortages. Th~ communes also represented a Chinese 
innovation of Marxism-Leninism, as well as a purer form of communism 
than that found in the Soviet Union. As such the communes constituted 
an ideological challenge to Khrushchev, by questioning his gradualist · 
policies of reaching communism. From these two challenges arose the con-
test over bloc leadership. 42 Thus, the communes presented a three-fold 
challenge to the Soviets; to basic Soviet economic planning; to the 
pace of domestic revolutionary advance (the Soviet path being unneces-
sarily long and tortuous); and to intra-bloc leadership. 
Mao had produced a Chinese variant of Marxism-Leninism. 
By 1960, Chinese journals were once again, as in 1949-51, 
claiming that Mao had 1 sinified' Marxism-Leninism. This 
contention is true. What is now referred to in the Chi-
nese press as 'the Mao Tse-tung ideology' is a peculiar 
blend of Marxism, Stalinism, Trotskyism, and pragmatism, 
based on a number of conditioning social and economic 
facto1;s never or no longer relevant in the Soviet Union.43 
Khrushchev's initial reaction to this peculiar blend was an oblique com-
parison in the fall of 1959 of Mao to Trotsky. The importance of the 
comparison of Maoism to Trotskyism is not strictly doctrinal, but lies 
r. "'::' 
in the fact that Khrushchev was pointing out that it differed from the 
orthodox Soviet view. The primary application of this theory is to the 
process of socialist and communist construction in a country already 
42 11 ror the Russians to concede this /the applicabili!.Y of the com-
munes for building communism is an underdeveloped countrlf would be 
tantamount to conceding to Peking the leadership of the revolution in 
Asia, Africa, and Latin America." Zagoria, p. 77. 
4~Ibid .• , p. 78. Mr. Zagoria espoused the view that "Maoism" is an 
original application of Marxism-teninism. This subject is heatedly de-
bated among China scholars. Benjamin Schwartz is one of the leading 
exponents of this view. See The China Quarterly, 13, for a thorough 
discussion of the question. 
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ruled by a Communist Party. This involves the question: what is the 
correct road to cormnunism? The Soviet view is that of a gradual tran-
sition to communism; this was Stalin's view, and was reiterated by 
Khrushchev. A socialist society "should evolve by the accumulation of 
elements of the new quality and a dying-away of the old, not ••• by quick 
leaps. 1144 The Chinese view, however, emphasized a quicker route to com-
munism, or the leap forward. The principal reason for the introduction 
of the cormnune system was to accelerate production. To make the policy 
consistent with Marxist-Leninist thought an ideological sleight of hand 
was introduced by the Maoists. 
The ideological challenge which the theories of the CCP imply is 
best expressed by Zagoria's use of three words: radicalism, chauvinism, 
and evangelism.45 The radicalism represents the justification of the 
accelerated pace by harking back to the classics of Marxism-Leninism, 
rather than following contemporary Soviet thought or even Stalinsim. 
Perhaps here lies Mao's resemblance to Trotsky. The chauvinism is 
obvious in references to Mao's increased stature as a "great" and "out-
standing" revolutionary, statesman, and tqeoretician. This is even per-
ceived in the growing cult of Mao which has developed in the Chinese 
press since late 1959. From this radicalism and chauvinism springs the 
traditic;mal result--a missionary zeal which seeks to evangelize and 
proselytize.46 The implication of Mao's sinified Communism is that this 
44Ibid. , p. 84. 
45Ibid., p. 102. 
'46Here an apt comparison may be made of Maoist ideology and religion, 
just as with historic communism. Just as ~ost religions seek to prosely-
tize their truth, so Maoist evangelism seeks to proselytize its brand of 
truth against competing truth--Soviet Communism. 
' 
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is the path which other underdeveloped countries of the world should 
follow. 
The Soviet reaction to this ideological challenge was a sort of 
qualified silence, followed by the Twenty-first Party Congress. Between 
these two events the Soviet press either ignored, distorted, or minimized 
the communes, while at the same time it stressed Moscow's own ideological 
claims.47 Then, one week after the adoption of the commune resolution, 
Khrushchev convoked for February 1959, the unscheduled Twenty-:first Con-
gress. "The Twenty-first Party Congress was, it seems, convoked in large 
measure because Khrushchev believed that he had to reply to the Chinese 
challenge in the highest forum available to him. 1148 
The Twenty-first Party Congress was essentially a restatement of the 
doctrines first stated at the Twentieth Congress. 49 In his speech to the 
Twenty-first Congress, Khrushchev emphasized that: 
in order to make the transition from capitalism to Commu-
nism, it was necessary to pass through a socialist phase 
of development which could not be violated or bypassed at 
will; second, there was no particular moment when a state 
could say 'we are now in Communism' (a concession to the 
Chinese insistence on continuity between socialism and 
Communism); third, Khrushchev drew a fine line as to the 
amount of haste with which the transition to Communism 
should be pursued.so 
47z · 109 agoria, p. • 
48 Ibid., P• 110. 
49rn his article Mr, Burin states that the Twenty-first Congress 
was merely a restatement of the Twentieth Congress propositions, making 
more explicit "that the continued existence of capitalism will hence-
forward be compatible with world peace." He also notes, however, that 
MacFarquar and Zagoria believe that it goes beyond the Twentieth. Burin, 
p. 345. 
50zagoria, p. 130. 
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These propositions presented nothing new, but seemed to be primarily an 
emphatic restatement of policies expressed at the Twentieth Congress, 
modified by the concilic;ltory Moscow Declaration, and now re-emphasized 
in reaction to the ideological challenge Mao .:extended ,via the --establish-
ment of the communes. Six months after this restatement of principles, 
Khrushchev indirectly attacked the communes in a speech in Poland July 
18, 1959, He referred to the 1918 Russian experience with communes, 
saying that nothing had come of these communes, and implying that nothing 
would come of the Chinese communes. 51 With this oblique attack the es-
trangement between the Soviets and the Chinese began to be more pro-
nounced. 
The next evidence of a widening of the gap in Sino-Soviet amiability 
was presented after the meeting of the Warsaw Treaty Powers in Moscow in 
February 1960. A Declaration was made at the close of the meeting and 
was closely followed by a comment on the Declaration by the Chinese ob-
server at the Conference, K'eng Sheng. In contrast to most of the Sino-
Soviet exchanges these two documents w~re couched in concre~e terms, 
rather than in abstract theoretical terms. The Declaration of Member-
States of the Warsaw Treaty was characterized by a remarkable optimism 
concerning the lessening of tension in the Cold War. 
264. 
The states represented at the present conference declared that 
they will act precisely in this direction and urge all other 
countries to promote the success of East-West talks and· to re-
frain from any steps capable of complicating these negotiations. 
••• They are unanimous in believing that in our time states do 
not and cannot have any great.er or nobler task than that of con-
. tributing to the establishment of lasting peace on earth. 52 
51Mehnert, p. 375. 
52Declaration of Member States of the Warsaw Treaty. In Floyd, p. 
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In contrast, the tone of K'eng Sheng's speech to the Warsaw Treaty meet-
ing was harder and more pessimistic, 
But U.S. imperialism, hostile to the Chinese people, has 
always adopted a discriminatory attitude against our country 
in international relations, Therefore the Chinese Govern-
ment has to declare to the world th~t any international 
agreements which are arrived at without. the formal patitici-
pation of the.Chinese People's Republic and the signature 
of its delegate cannot, of course, have any binding force 
on China, ••• This stand of ours is firm and unshakable.53 
The point which these two speeches illustrate seems to be, first, the 
conflict was broadening from the ideological sphere to that of policy; 
and ~econd, each side was becoming more intractable in its attitude to-
ward the other. 
In April 1960 the Chinese took the occasion of the ninetieth anni-
versary of Lenin's birthday to launch a series of articles which culmi-
nated in Khrushchev's reply at the Rumanian Party Congress at Bucharest 
1June 24, 1960. The first and most expressive article "Long Live Lenin-
ism t" appeared in~ Flag54 on April 16, 1960. 
With copious documentation from Lenin and Marx and pointed 
references to some of Communism's most.notorious heretics, 
the Chinese, in effect, accused Khrushchev of 'revising, 
emasculating, and betrayin~' the most fundamental and 
sacred tenets of Leninism. 5 
These detailed references to Marx and Lenin connoted a very important de-
velopment: the conflict was definitely being raised to the ideological 
plane. The effect was to challenge t~e right of Moscow to act as supreme 
arbiter of bloc policy by alleging Khrushchev to. be guilty of doctrinal 
53K1eng Sheng's Speech at the Warsaw Treaty Meeting. In Hudson, 
·pp. 72-77. 
54~ Flag is a Chinese Party fortnightly magazine, 
55 i Zagor a, p. 299, See the "Long Live Leninismt" article in full 
in Hudson, PP• 82-112. 
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deviations. Second, the Chinese were affirming the determination to per-
sist in their own views, and by implication, presenting themselves as 
leaders of Marxism-Leninism. 56 
The principal targets of the Chinese articles were Khrushchev's 
three new doctrines which he had presented at the Twentieth Congress: 
peaceful coexistence, the non-inevitability of war, and the possibility 
of peaceful roads to power in non-Communist countries. In the ''Long 
Live Leninismt" article the Chinese were insisting on their viewpoint 
towardthese points of doctrine. The Chinese endorsed peaceful coexis-
tence--their's and Lenin's view of it--as a "mere tactical expedient, 
pending the day when revolutionary hostility could openly declare it-
self.1157 Contradicting Khrushchev's doctrine of the non-inevitability 
of war, the<Chinese called not only for the continuance of revolutionary 
activity, but for a heightening of the revolutionary offensive. All 
revolutionary movements and "national liberation" movements should be 
supported and encouraged, because "the capitalist-imperialist system 
absolutely will not crumble of itself. It will be overthrown by the 
proletarian revolution, ••• 1158 This denied the validity of Khrushchev's 
other major assertion--the possibility o~.peaceful roads to powe~ in 
non-Communist countries. 
In addition to flatly rejecting Khrushchev's proposals of the Twen-
tieth Party Congress the article repea_ted two other themes. One was that 
Marxism-Leninism was not outdated and needed no modifications such as 
56Hudson, p. 78. 
57crankshaw, p. 94. 
58Text of the "Long Live Leninism!" article which appeared in Red 
Flag. In Hudson, p. 94. 
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Khrush~hev had proposed. 
The present world situation has obviously undergone tremen-
dous changes since Lenin's lifetime, but these cha·nges have 
not proved the obsoleteness of Leninism; on the contrary, 
they have more and more clearly confirmed the truths re-
vealed by Lenin and all the theories he advanced ••• The 
conclusion can only be this: whichever way you look at 
it, none of the new techniques like atomic energy, rocketry, 
and so on has changed, as alleged by the modern revisionists, 
the basic characteristics of the epoch of imperialism and 
proletarian revolution pointed out by Lenin •••• We believe 
in the absolute correctness of Lenin's thinking: War is an 
inevitable outcome of systems of exploitation and the source 
of modern wars is the imperialist system. Until the imperi-
alist system and the exploiting classes come to an end, wars 
of one kind or another will always occur, 59 
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The other theme running throughout the article was the invective hurled 
at "the modern revisionists represented by the Tito clique," the "modern 
revisionists,." and "opportunists," which were very thinly veiled impre-
cations again~t the Soviets. 60 Edward Crankshaw has summed up the 
"Long Live Leninism!" article: 
It was an elaborate, passionate, savage restatement of the 
Leninist position, utterly devoid of any spirit of compro-
mise or live-and-let live, wholly devoted to ways and means 
of achieving world revolution by the most direct available 
means in the shortest possible time. 61 
The Soviet reply to these vituperative Chinese attacks of Apr~l 1960 
came at the Rumanian Party Congress in 1June 1960. The first action of 
the Soviets at the Congress was a circular letter of June 21. This was 
an eig~ty-page letter prepared, before ~he Congress with the fraternal 
delegates to the Congress in mind. The letter was a basic restatement 
of the Soviet ideological position. It closed by blaming Peking for 
59Ibid. 
60These are found in numerous places in the text of the article, 
"Lo~ Live Leninism!" 
6lcrankshaw, p. 93. 
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weakening the unity of the Communist movement, 62 The Chinese rejoinder 
came in rather clandestine fashion through the circulation of a private 
letter from the Soviet party to the Chinese party, This letter was not 
intended to be seen by anyone but Chinese party officials, and was not 
expressed in Leninist polemics, but instead "threw in all sorts of 
charges. some of them having nothing to do with ideological differences, 
but rather with power relationships and inter-state rivalries. 1163 
The result of this last Chinese move was Khrushchev's vitriolic 
speech to the Congress in which he launched an open attack on the CCP, 
Mao, and Chinese policies. He claimed this was a disagreement between 
China and all the other parties; he attacked Mao by name, saying in 
effect "he was another Stalin and he was an ultra Leftist, an ultra 
dogmatist, and worst of all, a left revisionist, 1164 P'eng Chen, the 
Chinese delegate, replied to this extraordinary attack, saying it was 
evident that Khrushchev had organized the meeting for the sole purpose 
of attacking the Chinese Party and Mao Tse-tung, Peng then challenged 
the delegates to deduce from Soviet actions what Soviet policy really 
was. 65 
Out o.f this unprecedented display of polemics and emotionalism the 
delegates at the close of the Congress issued the Bucharest Communique. 
The communique was remarkable for its innocence and unity: 
The participants in the conference affirm unanimously that 
62Ibid., P• 103. 
63 Ibid,, p. 106. 
64Ibid., p. 107. 
65tbid., p. 111. 
the whole course of international events and the develop-
ment of the countries of the world socialist system have 
fully reaffirmed the correctness of the Marxist-Leninist 
theses of the Declaration and the Peace Manifesto adopted 
by the Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow in November 
1957. 66 .. 
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Between the Bucharest Congress in June and the Moscow Conference in 
November, the Soviet Union launched fresh offensives in Pravda and other 
Soviet publications. The emphasis in these writings was on the foolish-
ness of risking a world war and the inevi~ability;of Communist victory 
via economic competition. Just prior to the Moscow Conference the Chi-
nese set ·the stage for the. meeting with, ·eticles in the Chinese .press 
which illustrated the attitude of the Chinese delegation. "The major 
theme of these articles was on the need for revolutionary violence to 
smash bourgeois state power. 1167 It was apparent, then, at the opening 
of the Conference that neither side was in a conciliatory mood, and even 
more obvious was the Chinese determination to fight Moscow to the bitter 
end. 
The Open Break: The Moscow Conference of 1960 
The Moscow Conference occupies ultimate importance in the Sino-
Soviet dispute because it marked the end of efforts to wor~ out a com-
promise of ideological differences. After Moscow there could no longer 
be a question of whether or not things would come to a schism: the 
schism existed. After this presentation of the issues, the ideological 
dispute became a process of maneuvering for advantage within the Commu-
nist camp. Therefore, it is vital to ascertain what happened at the 
66Text of the Bucharest Communique. In Hudson, p. 140-1. 
67Hudson, p. 157 • 
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Conference and which ideological positions emerged from these events. 
The Conference ran from November ll to November 25, with delegates 
from eighty-one Commun~st parties. Khrushchev opened the Conference~ 
and Mikhail Suslov formally introduced the draft resolution. As the 
speeches of the delegates progressed, the Soviet position became clear. 
In surprising unity each delegate voiced criticism of the Chinese. On 
the 14th of November the Chinese had th~ir chance when the General Secre-
tary of the Chinese Communist Party, Teng Hsaio-ping, spoke. Teng con-
demned the Soviet Party letter of 5 November which had violently attacked 
the leadership of the Chinese Party and Mao Tse-tung personally, and 
charged the Russians with malicious misrepresentation of the Chinese 
position. 68 He asserted that the Soviets were the. "leading party," but 
there must be equality between countries; the Soviets must not bind all 
parties by their own Congresses. Teng further justified the schism by 
saying that if the Chinese were guilty of forming a fraction, then Lenin 
was also guilty when he split the Social Democratic Party into Bolsheviks 
and Mensheviks. "The Chinese had an equal :roight to form a f:roaction of 
this kind. And history wQuld tell whether or not the Chinese, in a mi-
nority, were wrong, 1169 This announcement that the Chinese were free to 
form their f:roaction was, to a system based on authoritarian rule from 
the top downward, announcement of a schism. 
The ne><t important speech was that of Enver Hoxha of Alba'hia. In ~ 
"· i,t was ·stated tha.t "China and Albania were in favor of peaceful coexis-
tence, but this presupposes the intensification of the class struggle 
68crankshaw, p. 124. 
69 Ibid., p. 129. 
.. 
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until we achieve the complete liquidation of imperialism. 1170 Hoxha then 
went on to bitterly denounce the Bucharest Conference and certain other 
Russian actions, especially Soviet unilateral action in the Hungarian 
revolution. 71 Gomulka of Poland resumed the attack on the Chinese, "He 
did not wish to wound the Chinese comrades by stigmatizing them as dogma-
tis~s, revisionists, fractionalists, sectarians, Trotskyites, schismatics 
--but what else were they to be called.'' 7 2 Later speeches by Teng. and 
Gomulka were merely rebuttals of the opening statements. Khrushchev's 
speech to the Congress, as Crankshaw states "had largely been directed 
against Mao without mentioning him directly. 1173 
The next step in this somewhat startling Conference was the Declara-
tion. The Moscow Declaration was essentially a Soviet document, and 
represented a Soviet victory. MacFarquhar States: 
The document that emerged, signea by all 9 expressed essen-
tially the Soviet views on the major points that had been 
in dispute, but contained a number of concessions to the 
Chinese. 74 
The Declaration represented a last attempt to res~ore a genuine unity to 
the Communist bloc. Yet 1 the Soviet and Chinese ideological positions 
which tl;le Conferenc.e defined were the final positions and the basis on 
which the dispute progressed. 
289. 
The Sino-Soviet dispute developed out of the three theses of the 
.70Notes made on Hoxha's speech of November 16 9 1960, In Floyd, p. 
71Ibid., PP• 289-290. 
72 Crankshaw, pp. 132-133. 
73 Ibid., p. 133, 
74Hudson, p. 174. 
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Twentieth Party Congress. The Chinese had never accepted these, but had 
only acq~iesced with the understanding that the settlement wouid come at 
a later date. The basic starting point of the ideological dispute arose 
over the definition of the "nature of the epoch." The Moscow Declaration 
states: "It is the principal characteristic of our time that the world 
socialist system is becoming the decisive factor in the development of 
society. 1175 This implied that the socialist powers had gained in numbers 
and influence relative to the non-Communist nations. However, this sup-
position was interpreted differently by the Chinese, who contended: 
The present epoch is still, as it was in Lenin's day, one of 
imperialism and wars, and that, despite an admitted growth in 
the might of the socialist camp, the revolutionary battle be-
tween imperialism and Communism is far from won; and the 
battle can only be won if the revolutionary forces intensify 
their efforts to win it. The world is divided into two mutu-
ally antagonistic camps between which there can be no collab-
oration.and ultimately no compromise. Imperialism is the enemy 
and must be defeated; every other consideration is subordinated 
to the need for carrying the revolution forward wherever and 
whenever possible.76 
In contrast to this "hard" line, the Sov~ets argued that imperial-
ism had changed from Lenin's time. They judged that the forces of social-
ism had grown stronger, and that it was possible to complete the revolu-
tionary process by superior economic and military power through the force 
of example. The definition of the nature of the epoch determined the 
attitudes of each on the use of violence in the ulitmate overthrow of 
imperialistic nations, The intransigent, somewhat fanatical Cqinese 
'\' 
position of no compromise with imperialism and revolutionary struggle 
against world capitalism minimized the dangers of nuclear war. In 
75Text of the Moscow Decla~ation. In Floyd, p. 297. 
76 Floyd, P• 113, 
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advocating a policy of "Communist liberation" for the world, the Chi-
nese proposed to employ Soviet nuclear power as a protective umbrella 
for their brinkmanship. However, the Soviets reached somewhat different 
conclusf6.ns: 
Can it be inferred ••• that world war is an indispens-
able condition, for the further intensification of the 
general crisis of capitalism? Such an inference would be 
absolutely wrong ••••• A proletarian revolution is not 
caused solely by military cataclysms; first and foremost 
it is the result of the development of the class struggle 
and of the internal contradictions of capitalism.77 
The result of this Soviet position was the policy of peaceful coexis-
tence, Khrushchev reported to the Moscow Conference that there was some 
hope of reaching a settlement with "that part of the bourgeoisie which 
sees the real danger of a thermonuclear war •••• 1178 The Soviets also 
were in some doubt as to the necessity of "national liberation" wars. 
Khrushchev in his post-conference speech of ,January 6 finally concluded 
that they were inevitable, as the colonialists would not grant indepen-
dence voluntarily. 79 However, there was a certain reluctance to condone 
these small wars, as the Soviet Union might have to support them even if 
it meant war with the West, Hence, the Soviet distinction between 
"local wars" which require bloc support, and national liberation wars. 
which would be strictly national movements. ~n the Declaration this 
whole distinction was glossed over by saying that in some cases there 
was a necessity for violence in obtaining socialism, while in other 
cases 9 depending on peculiar national conditions, socialism might be 
77 
Khrushchev's Report on the Moscow Conference, In Hudson, pp. 
207-21. 
78 · Ibid. , p. 214. 
79Khrushchev's Speech of January 6, 1961, In Floyd, p. 309, 
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achieved peacefully.so 
Related to th1a question of violent or nor.i-violent paths to socialism 
is the question of what path is to be pursued in the.building of social-
ism. This. question is more related to policy rather.than ideology. but 
nevertheless it is one of the most burning issues in_ the Sino-Soviet 
conflict, and involves what Mr. ,_Zagoria terms the locus of authority 
within the bloc. The Declaration states that 
The Soviet Union is successfully carrying on the full-scale .. 
construction of a communist society. Other countries are 
successfully laying the foundations for socialism; and some 
of them have already entered the period of construction of 
a developed socialist society. 81 
This statement, then, acknowledged the Soviet Union as the "leading 
party" of the Communisi; bloc. This would appear to be a desirable posi-
tion, However, prestige carries a commensurate responsibility and cer-
tain obligations. In a burst of modesty Khrushchev explained in his 
report of January 6 that the Soviet Union occupied. this leading position 
i 
merely because it was the oldest and largest, and therefore, more experi,;. 
enced party. Further, he noted that "At the moment, •• , it is not pos-
sible for leadership over socialist countries and Communist parties to 
be exercised from any centre at all. This is neither possible nor nec-
essary.1182 Reasoning from this point of polycentrism, Khrushchev then 
concluded that as conditions differ from country to country, it would be 
only natural that each Communist Par.ty should apply Marxism-Leninism to 
-its own particular conditions. However, Khrushchev continued, "one must 
80Text of the Moscow Declaration. In Hudson, p. 193. 
81Ibid. , p. 18 2. 
82Text of Khrushchev's Report on the Moscow Conference, January 6, 
1961, In Floyd, p. 310, 
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not inflate the importance of these distinctive feature, exaggerate them 
and overlook the basic general line of socialist construction charted in 
the doctrine of Marx and Lenin. 1183 
The ideological question of the correct path to socialism leads 
quite naturally into the more prosaic organizational question of how 
policy was to be decided in the Communist world and by whom. This is a 
highly crucial point as it determines whether Communism shall speak with 
many voices or with one. David Floyd discusses this point in detail, 
saying that the Chinese position appears to be that all parties in the 
Communist movement have equal rights in the working out of policy, and 
only policies and doctrines developed jointly by conferences (as in Mos-
cow in 1957) had binding force on the movement as a whole. Toward this 
end the Chinese favored both international meetings and the creation of 
some form of executive international body. 84 The Soviet view was some-
what le.ss clear, as it was opposed to such an international body, and to 
the naming of the Soviet Union as "leader" of the Communist world. But 
it was equally opposed to "fractional'' activities within the movement. 
This was. in effect, a demand for obedience by all parties 
to agreed decision taken at conferences. And, despite their 
apparent unwillingness to be the 'leader,' they wanted the 
statements of principle made at their Twentieth and Twenty-
first Congresses to be accepted as valid additions to Marx-
ism-Leninism.85 
The reason for this ambiguous Soviet position seems to be that the Soviet 
Union would like to "have its cake and eat it too," so to speak. As Mr. 
Floyd states: 
83 Hudson, p. 220. 
84Floyd, p. 115, 
85Ibid. 
"· 
The Russians, owners of the main wealth and the only nuclear 
power in the Communist world, were not prepared to have others 
deciding how the wealth and power should be used. At the same 
time, they did not want to lose the use and control of an 
international political movement which wa.s an invaluable adjunct 
to their foreign policy.86 
On whatever points they may differ all chroniclers of the Sino-
Soviet dispute agree on one point: the Moscow Conference accomplished 
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nothing toward bridging the gap betw_een the Soviet Union and China. It 
served only to bring the confiict into the open and to create more 
bitterness. David Floyd succinctly comments: 
.The true significance of this meeting of eighty-one Commu-
nist parties in Moscow in November 1961 was that the Russians 
and Chinese had failed, after long and exhaustive discussions 
and despi~e the presence of many of the best brains in the 
Communist movement, to compose their differences on the !'ide-
ologica.l' or the I organizational' plane. Within the movement, 
indeed, the conference probably served to draw attention to 
the extent of the rift between Moscow and Peking and to oblige 
leaders of many parties not previously aware of or involved in 
the dispute to consider its implications for themselves. The 
conference marked the beginning, not of agreement between the 
two s.ides but of the. process of rallying support for each of 
them, or 'polarization' in the Commµnist movement.87 
After the Moscow Conference the only remaining step in the open 
breach between the Soviets and the Chinese was the Twenty-Second Soviet 
Party Congress in October 1961. At this Congress Albania became the 
alter ego for China and Khrushchev bitterly attacked Albania., primarily 
on the charge that it had defied the agreed decisions of the 1957 and 
1960 Moscow Declarations. William Griffith points out: 
Tirana had been so clearly within the Soviet sphere of in-
fluence and was so small and so totally dependent upon out-
side help that Khrushchev must have felt the Soviet Union's 
prestige simply could not suffer successful Albanian 
86Ibid. 
87 Ibid., P• 127. 
defiance. For this reason he had to attack Hoxha and defy 
Mao in the process; as he said in his first speech, on a 
question of principle Moscow could not yield 'either to the 
Albanian leaders or to anyone else. 1 88 
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The result was, as Griffith says, "an international sensation," and the 
whole Sino-Soviet conflict became an open secret. 
The role of Albania in this complex drama was both that of a pawn 
and that of a more direct participant with genuine grievances. The pri-
mary grievance was Khrushchev's failure to take a strong enough stand 
against Yugoslavian "revisionism." This point is, obviously,:not ideolo-
gical. It has its direct origins in the almost pathological fear and 
hatred with Albania holds for Yugoslavia. Also the de-Stalinization 
policy of Khrushchev was another source of divergence, because Hoxha was 
considered to be a "little Stalin," and an attack on Stalin was an indi-
rect attack on Hoxha and his techniques. Albania was able to success-
fully defy Moscow, the culmination being the breaking of Soviet-Albanian 
diplomatic relations on November 25, 1961. This signified the worsening 
of Sino-Soviet relations, as the Chinese never withdrew their support of 
Albania. As was said by a Chinese delegate: "The friendship between 
the Chinese and Albanian peoples, based on the principles of Marxism-
Leninism and proletarian internationalism, is unbreakable and no force 
can destroy it. 1189 
With the severing of diplomatic relations between Albania and Mos-
cow, Albania's primary role as pawn in the dispute ended. Soon after 
this it became apparent that Khrushchev's bitter invective directed 
88William Griffith, Albania~~ Sino-Soviet Split (Cambridge, 
1963), p. 89. 
89Quoted from Griffith, p. 93. 
against Albania at the Twenty-second Party Congress was only a veiled 
attack upon Mao which was soon lifted. After this Khrushchev and Mao 
began discussing each other, rather than Albania and Yugoslavia.· The 
arguments began to broaden into issues of policy, as well as Leninist 
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semantics. Hence, the real issues of the Sino-Soviet dispute began to 
emerge. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY IN THE DISPUTE 
The Sino-Soviet dispute first came to world attention via the ide-
ological exchanges between the two countries. It continued to be waged 
primarily within ideological terms of reference. To call the dispute 
purely ideological, however, is to be unrealistic. The real sources of 
the dispute seem to center over dlfferences in national interest, and 
the policies based on national interest, between the two countries. 
Mar:dsm-Lenini.sm does, of course, play a role in the dispute. However, 
ideology deserves interest primarily as a device to talk about matters 
of national interest. Why has the dispute been waged in ideological 
terms? To answer this vital question leads to a discussion of ideology 
and the Russian and Chinese experiences with ideology. 
The Importance of Ideology 
The phenomenon of ideology is one of the most important elements,. 
and. certainly the most dynamic element, in politics. An ideology such 
as Chx'istianity 1 nationalis~, or communism can c:reate or destroy whole 
civilizations, topple governments or ch~nge the face ~f the world, and 
. has. No one can deny the vitality of ideology in politics. One approach 
to politics 1 the monistic ideological approach, says ·we can know politics 
from studying political ideologies. Necessary to the ideological ap·-
,. 
proach to politics, however, is the assumption that men act politically 
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in response to their ideals. In the Middle Ages when a theocracy more 
or less controlled Europe this may have been true, But since Machiavelli, 
in !h=. Prince, realistically described how men acquire, retain, a.nd use 
power, it has been exposed that men, more often than not, do not act in 
response to their ideals. More often the ideals are used to fulfill more 
realistic ends. "The important difference is the difference between the 
instrumental approach to ideas and the manipulative approach. 111 
It is the ideological approach to politics which is sometimes used 
to study the Sino-Soviet dispute. The reason is obvious: the dispute 
has been conducted in ideological terms. Furthermore, the Sino-Soviet 
alliance was concluded basically because the Soviet Union wished to ex-
tend recognition and aid to a new Communist state. However, it can be 
seen by looking at the terms of the alliance that there were also vital 
economic and political factors. The ideological dispute tends to obscure 
the other elements of the alliance. "It /ideologx./ has tended to give 
the impression to the non-Communist observer that the Russians and Chi-
nese were arguing about ideas and not about practical politics. 112 Ide-
ology is an important part of the dispute, but it does not, obviously, 
play a determining role. What began as an instrumental attitude to ideas 
has, unfortunately, ended in a manipulative attitude. 
Uses of Ideology 
The realistic motives of personal ambition and power are the goals 
which politicians generally seek. Hans J. Morgenthau posits that men act 
1Max Lerner, Ideas~ Weapons (New York, 1939), p. 12. 
2 Floyd, p. 199. 
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politically in response to a power drive, that politics is a struggle for 
power, and that power is the motivating goal of politics. Whether all of 
Mr. Morgenthau's propositions are accepted or not, his major thesis is 
valid: men do act politically out of these motives more often than not. 
As a means to achieve the goals of politics, ideology is usually used. 
Because they conflict with deep-seated moral values, these selfish. 
motives cannot be openly admitted. Some politicians even conceal them 
from their own souls. Egoism cannot be revealed because of the fabric of 
every civilization requires that political leaders at least appear to be 
self-sacrificing. "There is a vast difference between man's actual be .. 
havior according to the necessities or urges of a given situation 1 and 
the ideas concerning social and political action which such a situation 
evokes in him. 113 This is often the position in which Communists, as 
followers of a specific ideology, find themselves. Ideology provides a 
mask behind which political actors obscure their real motives and also 
serves as a reationalization in order to justify political power both to 
thei~ followers and to themselves. 
In addition to providing the leaders with a rationalization, ideolo-
. FJ,..J}!\.-. 
gy provides the masses with a raison d 1etre'. Life is often not only te---
dious, but actually miserable. Often it is only an ideal which forces 
them to go on enduring misery. In the Middle Ages it was the other-
worldliness of Christianity with its rewards in the life after death 
which inspired the average serf.· And today the ideals of religion with 
its transcendental reward or a political ideology with its promise of 
earthly reward is what sustains many people. Ideology often provides 
3John Herz. Political Realism !!E.Political Idealism (Chicago, 
1951), P• 6, 
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men with hope and a reason for living. 
On a governmental level ideology is often used to legitimize a 
state's policies. This is a ramification of the mask-like character of 
ideology. In its policy--be it domestic or foreign--a state is always 
most highly motivated by its national interest. "The idea of interest 
is indeed of the essence in politics and is unaffected by the circum-
stances of time and place."4 Ideals, it is true, may motivate a state 
to support certain policies not wholly in its national interest, but 
rarely will a state consciously pursue a path known to lead to destruc-
tion merely for the sake of ideology. States are always checked in their 
idealism by national self-interest. Often, however, a nation's best 
interests are difficult to discern, and often a government must embark 
on policies which seem to be against national interest. In this case, 
the government must legitimate its policies to the people. So, ideology 
is used as a tool to obtain support for present or future policies. 
These are genera.l statements concerning the uses of ideology, which 
have obvious applications to Russia and China, Marxism-Leninism provides 
a base for action. The people of Russia and China have endured priva-
tions in the hope of the promised abundance of the future Communist 
society, and the ideology legitimizes extreme policies such as the com-
yii,-, ;.J.t_JJ,,,;\ ~..,,, \- o vi -f~u1 
munes in China. At l'l"esen:at·both countries &be justifyi-Rg their actions 
through Marxist-Leninist polemics. Unfortunately, the use of a common 
ideology in very different cultural and temporal settings has produced 
difficulties. 
4Hans J, Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York, 1960), p. 8, 
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The Revolutionary Experience in Russia and China 
Despite the many factors involved in the Sino-Soviet conflict there 
is one historical perspective which must be taken into consideration. 
This might be termed the revolutionary experience of Russia and China. 
Both nations experienced revolutions which rent asunder the very fabric 
of their traditional civilizations. The Russian Revolution occurred in 
1917, while the Chinese Communists took power only in 1949. This is a 
time differential of thirty-two years. As Mr. Floyd has stated: "1949 
was·for Mao what 1917 had been for the Russian Communists. 115 This time 
differential of thirty-two years is important because the world and con-
ditions in it have changed in the years between the revolutions, yet the 
same infallible rules and unchangeable ideology did not change, at least 
in outward appearances. 
Marxist ideology is a dynamic ideology, since it seeks to implement 
change. Opposing this is the static ideology, which desires to perpet-
uate things as they are. These represent the two primary types of ide-
ology• which serve two different purposes. These two types of ideology 
serve "to legitimize power or challenge the existing power relations. 116 
Static ideology, or status quo ideology, seeks to perpetuate the status 
quo relationship of power, It is in much the easier position, as it has 
already won a certain amount of moral legitimacy merely by virtue of its 
being in existence. It would not be in existence had it not obtained a 
certain consensus already. By virtue of the legitimacy it possesses 
5Floyd, P• 12 
6Roy Macridis, :!l!!. Study .2f.. Comparative Government (New York, 1962), 
p. 26. 
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(but also dependent on the degree of approval it possesses) the static 
ideology need not conceal its motives as much as an ideology which de-
sires a change, 
The other type of ideology is termed the dynamic, revolutionary, or 
imperialist ideology. It seeks to change the relationship of power which 
exists. Upon this type of ideology is placed the burden of proof. That 
is, it must prove that the present regime is unjust and must be changed. 
To do this, revolutionary ideologies usually employ a natural law doc-
trine. Natural law implies the ought of politics--the law as it should 
be ideally, The dynamic ideology sees the existing positive law as un-
just and feels it must be rectified. Its main purpose is to justify the 
need for change in a system--to challenge existing power relations. In 
order for a change to take place there must be a reason for change.· By 
virtue of this fact, it must prove that the static ideology in power has 
failed to fulfill basic needs of the state. 
; 
It must prove that the status quo it seeks to overthrow de-
serves to be overthrown and that the moral legitimacy which 
in the minds of many attaches to things as they are ought 
to yield to a higher principle of morality calling for a 
new distribution of power, 7 
This has happened in Russia and China. 
Thermidorean Reaction in Russia 
Marxism as a revolutionary ideology has succeeded in overthrowing 
a status-quo ideology when the conditions were ripe for such change. 
However, once in power, the revolutionary ideology gradually and inevi-
tably becomes a status-quo ideology. Milovan Djilas, a close observer, 
''Morgenthau, 84, 
has made this statement: 
To date, Soviet Communism, the type which has existed the 
longest and which is the most developed, has pass$d thl'ough 
three phases. This is also more or less true of-other types 
of Communism which have succeeded in coming to power (with 
the exception of the Chinese type, which is still predomi-
nantly in the second phase). The three phases are: revolu-
tionary, dogmatic, and non-dogmatic Communism. Roughly speak-
ing, the principal catch-words, aims, and personalities corres-
ponding to these verious phases are: Revolution, or the usurpa-
tion of power--Lenin; 'Socialism,' or the building of the 
system--Stalin. 'Legality,' or stabilization of the system--
'collective leadership. 18 
This process has already occurred in Russia and possibly will occur in 
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China in the future. The process has also been called the embourgeois-
ment9 of Russia. Basically, the Russian Communists have realized the 
folly of idealism and have become more realistic. These all refer to 
the same process which Crane Brinton in his book, .'.!:!!!Anatomy £!_Revolu-
. tion, has termed "The Thermidorean Reaction. nlO As Mr. Brinton states, 
"Thermidor is not by any means something unique, limited to the French 
Revolution from which it takes its name. 1111 The Marxists, or rather, the 
Trotskyites and other anti-Stalinist heretics, have often applied the 
word to the Russian Revolution •••• 1112 
In accordance with his conceptual scheme Brinton describes the 
8Milovan Dj ilas, The New Class, ~ Analysis of the · Communist System 
(New York, 1958) 1 p. 1677 -
9This term is coined by T. H. Rigby in his article, "The Embourg .. 
eoisement of the Soviet Union and the Proletarianization of Communist 
China," Unity~ Contradiction, ed. Kurt London (New York, 1962), p. 26. 
lOerane Brinton, ~Anatomy .9!_Revolution (New York, 1952), Chapter 
a, "Thermidor." 
llBrinton, p. 262. 
l 2Ibid., P• 226. 
70 
Thernidorean reaction as "a convalescence from the fever of revolu-
tion.1113 It is characterized by an abating of the excesses of the revo-
lution which has occurred. There are several primary evidences of this: 
••• moral letdown, a process of concentration of power in the 
hands of a 'tyrant' or a 'dictator,' a seeping back of exiles, 
a revulsion against the men fQo had made the Terror, a return 
to old habits in daily life. 
These reactions seem to be inevitable. The ideals of a revolution carry 
men to heights of ecstasy; but men cannot long live in the rarified a.ir 
of mountain-top experiences. Soon a desire for a calm, orderly life as-
serts itself. 
That this process of Thermidorean reaction occurred in Russia is 
clearly seen, as events since 1920 have fulfilled most of the character-
istics noted above. Brinton discusses in some detail this point in re-
gard to the aggressive nationalism of the Russians after a brief flirta-
" 
tion with Marxist internationalism. "Since 1939 only a very _casehardened 
fellow traveler can doubt that Marxist Russia is at least as ardently, 
as simply, and as aggressively nationalistic as ever was Czarist Rus-
sia.1115 Brinton's conclusion (as well as other Russian experts) is that 
Russia has indeed seen no restoration as complete as France or England, 
but "in Russia we really are back to normal in 1952--normal for Rus-
sia,1116 
Thus. in the process of revolution and reaction. both the people of 
a state and the ideology undergo a Thermidor, during which there is a 
13Ibid. 
14Ibid., p~ 262. 
l 5Ibid. • p. 236. 
16rbid., P• 252. 
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return to many of the forms and attitudes of the former regime. This 
has gradually been happening in Russia and will undoubtedly (human nature 
being universally similar) occur in China. 
It is primarily in this connection that the new policies in 
Communist China appear to be ideologically, and not just 
practically, significant, for they bear an imprint of 
utopian extremism which goes beyond anything currently 
practiced in Soviet Russia. In the USSR early visions of 
a perfect society without personal property, family ties 
or the use of money have faded with the passing of time; 
in China, on the contrary, there is still a fanatical faith 
in the early attainment of the Utopian paradise of primi-
tive Marxism.17 
The central fact to keep in mind is that Thermidor has already occurred 
in Russia, but has yet to occur in China. The time differential involved 
has created a dichotomy of attitudes and outlook which cannot fail to 
affect relations between the two countries. 
In addition to these typical experiences which affect the Russian 
and Chinese revolutions, there are certain specific factors of the revo-
lutionary experiences which have contributed further to the dichotomy of 
outlook. Just as an individual's whole outlook and perspective of life 
is shaped by his early experiences, so the Sino-Soviet conflict has been 
shaped by historical experiences. 
Historical experience demonstrates that the two countries were es-
sentially dissimilar when they experienced revolution, "When, after the 
Lfirs,y"world war, Mao Tse-tung decided to conquer China for Communism, 
he found a situation completely different from the one Lenin had to face 
in 1917, 1118 On the other hand, the acsolutist character of the ideology 
17G. F. Hudson, "New Phase in Mao's Revolution," Problems of Commu-
nism VII (1958), p. 10. -
18Alexandre Metaxas, Moscow~ Peking? (London, 1961) 1 p. 46. 
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indicated identical procedures for both countries. This situation pre-
sents a logical impossibility, for two countries cannot be different, 
yet alike. It is this experience which presents a basic incompatibili-
ty--an incompatibility precluding any discussion of solutions. 
The characteristics of Marxist ideology put it in the category of 
absolutistic ideology. That is, it posits its conceptions to be those 
of objective reality and admits no alternative solutions. The logical 
consequence of this orientation is the characte~istic of infallibility, 
and consequently, changelessness. However, this represents an inherent 
fallacy, for however absolute an ideology or an ideal may be, it is im-
plemented by men--who have differing opinions and perspectives. There-
fore, any absolutist ideology is irrevocably subject to personal influ-
ences. This is true of Marxism also. It has been conditioned and in-
fluenced by men and by history. This is especially true in its applica-
tion to the sources of the Sino-Soviet conflict. 
When Marx first set forth his ideas for the overthrow of bourgeois 
society, he conceived certain conditions to be prerequisites for the 
revolution. Marx imagined that the revolution would occur in a highly 
industrialized society. This was a projection of the society he saw in 
nineteenth-century England. It was divided into only two classes--
workers and capitalists--who were unceasingly at war with each other. 
Necessary, then, for his revolution was a highly industrialized society. 
The reality of the situation was much different, however. It was some 
fifty years before Marx's ideas were implemented. In this passage of 
time, his ideas became almost outdated. The conditions of mid-nineteenth 
century England were as he had observed--the workers were exploited by 
the capitalists. However, these conditions soon changed, 
At the first rigors of early industrialization passed and the 
capital created thereby began to be reflected in a rising per 
capita national income, benefits started trickli.ng down to the 
workers in the form of improved working conditions, housing, 
community services, more leisure, and, most important of all; 
consumption levels rising above mere subsistence and permitting 
the accumulation of a modest store of personal and family 
property.19 · 
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Similarly the passage of time between Marx's writings and their implemen-
tation had an effect on his theories, as did the "objective reality" of 
the situation. 
The first Communist government was established in Russia, one of the 
least industrialized countries in Europe. The impetus of the revolution 
came from the two cities which were industrialized, true, but allowance 
also had to be made for the rest of the country which was peasant. 
The Russian proletariat was one of the instruments of the 
Communists in the 'proletarian revolution' of November, 
1917, and in the Civil War that followed. Consequently, 
alongside the populist slogan of 'land to the tillers,' 
Bolshevik tactics found a place for the syndicalist 
slogan of 'worker's contro1. 120 
Thus, the addition of the populist slogans to arouse the peasantry rep-
resented an addition to traditional Marxism and gave it a Russian flavor. 
Lenin himself recognized this. At the Fourth Congress to the Comintern, 
October 13, 1922, he stated: 
At the Third Convention, in 1921, we adopted a resolution on 
the organizational structure of the Communist Party and what 
activities it should conduct and how. This resolution is a 
wonderful one, but it is almost consistently Russlan--t~ft is, 
everything in it is taken from the Russian environment. 
Since 1949 Marxism-Leninism has now been adapted to Chinese society 
19Rigby, p. 20. 
20Ibid., p. 22. 
21Quoted from Masamichi Inoki, "Leninism and Mao Tse-tung's Ideolo-
gy1" London, p, 114. 
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and conditions--Sinified--as it had once been Russianized. As Mao him-
self stated: '' As for the Chinese Communist Party, it must learn to apply 
the theories of Marxism-Leninism to the real environment in China. 1122 
The "real environment" in China prior to 1949 consisted of an unindustri-
alized society with a large peasant base. 
The contrast between urban-based Russian Communism and 
village-based Chinese Communism can be exaggerated; ••• 
nevertheless, working-class participation was undoubtedly 
a much greater factor in the Russian Revolution than in 
the Chinese,23 
Marxist ideology had to be modified to fit the reality of the situation. 
Mao based his movement on the peasant majority of China. After the revo-
lution attention was given to creating a working class by regimenting the 
peasants into communes. 24 This was the most obvious Sinification of 
Marxism-Leninism, It became Maoism. 
The fact that Chinese Communism became Sinified cannot be emphasized 
too much, Mao developed a unique method of bringing Communism to China. 
This method involved gaining support in the villages among the peasants 
rather than the traditional Marxist method of beginning in the cities 
and carrying Communism to the villages. Mao's goal was to gain the sup-
port of the peasantry, then storm the cities, the stronghold of the im-
perialists. His methods were first unkown to Moscow; later they had no 
authority from Moscow. After the failure of Stalin's directives 
: 22Ibid., P• 113. 
23Rigby, p. 22. 
24rn essence, proletarianization consists of alienating the individ-
ual from all traditional ties and binding him instead to the party. This 
is what the Chinese accomplished in the communes. See Rigby's article, 
p. 20, 
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exhorting traditional Communist tactics, Mao's policies were officially 
sanctioned in 1931 by the Comintern. During the crucial period of the 
1930 1s and the period of the last Civil war, Chinese Communism developed 
quite independently of Russian support. The Chinese revolution was self-
made. As such, China owed nothing to Russia. In this respect, Chinese 
Communism is similar to the Yugoslavian and Albanian Communist movements, 
with all the same implications. 
The Failure of Ideology in the Alliance 
The Sino-Soviet alliance was concluded in spite of divisive factors 
which had existed throughout the centuries as well as in more recent 
times. The agreement plainly pointed out China's economic, as well as 
political, dependence upon Russia. China received much-needed economic 
and military aid from Russia, and political support for her interests in 
the international sphere. In return, China could only offer territorial 
concessions and her passive support as an ally in the East. China was 
a "have-not." The alliance was obviously ideological, based on mutual 
adherence to Marxism-Leninism. The alliance was unusual. In fact, it 
has even been called "peculiar." 
Neither sociological nor power factors can account fully for 
the peculiar alliance between the Soviet Union and Communist 
China. The factor of shared ideology, a shared core of be-
lief, remains crucial. There are aspects of the alliance 
which can be explained only in terms of the overriding im-
portance of this factor,25 
The alliance was, in actual fact, necessary to the interests of Communist 
bloc unity, The Soviet Union could not ignore the existence of a new 
"socialist'' country, even though the revolution had been wrought without 
25Boorman, p. 122. 
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Soviet help or direction. 
This alliance between two of the largest countries in the world was 
a formidable threat, especially based as it was on the ideology of Commu-
nism. However, this was its very weakness. Ideology was helpful only 
if the national interests of the Soviet Union and China coincide. The 
alliance was relatively untested in the first years of its existence, 
except for the Korean War. China was engaged in consolidating her re-
gime, and the Soviet Union was doing much the same as a result of Stalin's 
death. However, when Khrushchev emerged as the undisputed leader, policy 
in Russia, of necessity, underwent a change. Russia began to follow a 
status-quo policy, going so far as a detente with the West. Simulta-
neously, China had become an established power, full of revolutionary 
ardor, and desiring to pursue a dynamic policy. It is clear that a 
status-quo policy and a dynamic policy cannot work together, nor can one 
ideology shelter them both. The national interests of the two allies· 
had diverged. Only ideology remained, but it alone was inadequate to 
check the conflict of interests. Instead, the "binding" element of ide-
ology was used as a means to wage the dispute. 
Marxism-Leninism as a Means to Wage the Dispute 
Marxist-Leninist ideology is the framework within which the Soviet 
Union and China now think and act. However Tsarist or Confucian or tra-
ditional their policies may appear to be, or however Russianized or Sini-
fied their versions of Communism may be, their frame of reference and 
language are Marxist-Leninist. Hence, alliances, agreements, and quar-
rels are carried out in Marxist-Le~inist language. The ideology may be 
used for manipulation as necessity demands, but it is still the system 
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of state belief, just as democracy may be for other states. Hence, when 
the Sino-Soviet alliance began to experience conflicts, the natural idiom 
of its expression was Marxist-Leninist polemics. 
In the Sino-Soviet alliance China was placed in the vulnerable posi-
tion of being a dependent ally. She could only urge the stronger partner 
to look after her interests, but she had no means of forcing attention 
to them. China wished to pursue a dynamic foreign policy, but Khrushchev 
made it clear that the Soviet Union was interested in a status-quo policy. 
Failing to make her influence felt, China attacked the Soviet Union with 
the only weapon she had--Marxist-Leninist ideology. This was the Soviet 
Union's weak spot--her waning application and subsequent modifications of 
ideology--and China's strong point. Hence, Marxism-Leninism became the 
Chinese weapon of attack, with the Soviet reply naturally couched in the 
same frame of reference. 
The ideological arguments had the effect of obscuring the realistic 
conflicts of national interest. 
Ideology has tended to give the impression to the non-Com-
munist observer that the Russians and Chinese were arguing 
about ideas and not about practical politics •••• In fact, 
as every Marxist, at least, should have been ready to ac-
knowledge--ideology has always played a secondary role in 
the dispute. It has done little more than provide the medium 
through which differences could be aired without spelling 
them out in terms of day-to-day policies.26 
The differences could not be discussed realistically or openly, ironi-
cally enough, because of ideology--differences between members of the 
Communist bloc could not be discussed because theoretically they could 
not exist. 
Communist bloc unity is a very important reason why the dispute was 
26 Floyd, P• 199. 
78 
waged in Marxist-Leninist symbols. The ideology of Communism and the 
"bootstrap" examples of Russia and China have exerted an enormous impact 
on the underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa. This advantage over 
the imperialists could not be sacrificed, if at all possible, because of 
a split between the two great Commµnist powers. Hence, if only questions 
of ideology and not prosaic power politics were involved, the myth of 
Communism and its impact were not destroyed, 
The ex.tent to which ideology is a determinant of the policy of a 
state is one of those variables in politics which can never be ascer-
tained with any surety.· However, ideology is usually secondary to na-
tional interest. In the particular case of the Sino-Soviet conflict 
this is especially true. It was considered, even in the earliest stages 
of the dispute, that the arguments about correct interpretations of 
Marx.ism-Leninism were merely a camouflage. Later this became undeniably 
obvious. The ideological ex.changes between the USSR and China began in 
1956 with Khrushchev's two speeches to the Twentieth Party Congress of 
the CPSU, and have continued to the present time. However, a noticeable 
change in the tone and in the content of the exchanges became evident in 
1963. At this time Russia and China began to interject non-ideological 
criticisms among the Leninist polemics. Prosaic questions of national 
interest and power relationships became evident. The dispute had dropped 
its ideological mask. Only at this time did the real issues of the Sino-
Soviet dispute emerge in terms of a conflict between two opposing nation-
al interests. 
CHAPTER V 
CONFLICTS OF NATIONAL INTEREST IN THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE 
"I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle 
wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma. But perhaps there is a key. 
That key is Russian national interest."1 The eminent Si1:1 Winston sue-
cinctly expressed not only the key to Russian behavior, but also perhaps 
the key to the Sino-Soviet dispute. National interest is defined by 
Feliks Gross "as the general and continual ends for which a nation acts. 
Despite changing modes of expression, national interests are the con-
stants rather than the variables of internationalrelations. 112 National 
interest is usually independent of the form of government. but is depen-
dent on constant quantities of size, geography. and resources. The 
Soviet Union and China exist as two distinct national states with two 
distinct national interests. Their national interests have now come in-
to conflict, In pre-nuclear or traditional times the call to arms might 
already have sounded. In this age the Soviet Union and China are reduced 
to hurling insults at ea~h other couched in a peculiar vocabulary. 
The peculiar vocabulary and ideology of Marxism-Leninism exemplifies 
a new element introduced into the traditional Sino-Soviet rivalry. The 
new rivalry is not strictly a traditional rivalry of national interest, 
lRadio broadcast of l October 1939. Reprinted in W. Churchill, The 
Gathering Storm (London, 1948), p. 403, 
2Feliks Gross. Foreign Policy Analysis (New York, 1954), p. 53. 
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as thought of in nineteenth century terms. Yet it is not only an ide-
ological quarrel over varying interpretations of Marxist-Leninist doc-
trine. Rather, the ideological quarrel introduces new elements into a 
traditional rivalry. These new elements involve competition for leader-
ship of the Communist bloc and, owing to the international viability of 
Communism, the struggle for influence over the whole world, particularly 
in the new countries of Asia and Africa, and the not-so-new countries of 
Latin-America. Marxism-Leninism has given Russia and China a new lan- · 
guage in which to expound, and new things to argue about, so to speak. 
Without the framework of Marxism-Leninism the dispute would undoubtedly 
exist, but it would lack the world-wide ramifications and consequences 
which it does have. 
New Orientations in Soviet Policy 
The natural consequence of Stalin's death in 1953 was a reorienta-
tion of the Soviet Union. Stalin had ruled the country with an iron 
hand for almost thirty years in a very personal sort of way. There was 
no clear-cut successor to his mantle, so a cautious collegium assumed 
leadership. Two of the immediate actions of the USSR after Stalin's 
death point out the prevailing desire of the new leaders to stabilize 
relations and to ease some of the situations Stalin had created in his 
latter years. 
One of these actions was to secure their relationship with China, 
by furthering Soviet aid. Stalin had more or less ignored China, both 
in the period of the l920's and 1930 1s as well as after the emergence of 
Communist China. In 1950, after the Chinese Communists assumed power, 
Stalin actually had no choice but to conclude an alliance, offer aid, 
and exchange ambassadors, since both countries were following the same 
monolithic ideology. 
The Treaty ••• represented a retreat by Stalin from some of the 
positions taken up with regard to China in 1945, ••• But in 
practice Stalin gave away precious little that mattered.3 
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Clearly the success of their Chinese brothers presented a problem to the 
Soviets, which has not yet been solved. Stalin had tended to emphasize 
Europe, to the exclusion of Asia, While the Chinese were concentrating 
on internal problems, Stalin concentrated on post-war European affairs. 
When Stalin died there followed the necessarily indecisive period in 
Soviet affairs. Hence, the new leaders tool<: pains to consolidate the 
alliance with China. The result was the agreements of 1954, which fur-
thered Soviet aid. 
The second course of action was a cautious proposal to resume nor-
mal diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia. 
The survival of Yugoslavia as an independent Communist state 
after 1948 created a potential ideological rival and hazard 
for the Soviet Union. After Stalin died on March 5• 1953, 
the new Soviet rulers apparently decided to reduce or eli-
minate the political liabilities they had inherited from 
their old master, 4 . 
Tito accepted the invitation and diplomatic relations were renewed, as 
well as barter agreements concluded in October 1954, Relations between 
the two states were further strengthened when Khrushchev went to Beograd 
fo~ talks with Tito in late May 1955, The final Declaration issued after 
their talks said: 
The two governments have agreed to undertake further measures 
3r1oyd, p. 11. 
4Vaclav L. Benes, ed., The Second Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute (Notre 
Dame, n.d.), p. xiv, 
for the normalization of their relations and the development 
of co-operation between the two countries, being confident 
that this is in line with the interests of the two countries. 5 
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Rapprochement with Yugoslavia was a part of the policy of the relaxation 
of Stalin-created tensions in Europe. Tito, however, maintained Yugo-
slavia's independence from satellite status, remained outside the Commu-
nist monolith, and held to his "revisionist" ideological opinions. It 
appeared to be a Soviet pursuit of Tito. 
A third arena of action for the new Soviet regime was Asia. This 
area had also been ignored, relative to Soviet interest in Europe, by 
Stalin. In November and December of 1955 Khrushchev made visits to India, 
Afghanistan and Burma. The very fact that he made this tour only six 
months after the Bandung Afro-Asian Conference, from which the Soviets 
were tactfully excluded, seems to indicate that the Soviet Union had not 
acknowledged the relegation of the Asian world to China. "Certainly 
Khrushchev was serving notice on Mao that Russia's interest in Asia was 
no less than China's, and that he was not going to tolerate any division 
of the world into Communist spheres of influence, 11 6 
The shift to the right in Soviet policy was dramatically announced 
by Khrushchev at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in 1956. His 
speeches expressed in the Marxist-Leninist framework the shift in Soviet 
policy. As was discussed in Chapter III these new pronouncements in-
volved primarily the idea of "peaceful coexistence," and the related 
idea, the non-inevitability of war. Ideologically, the pronouncements 
meant that Khrushchev was making some extl"aordina-ry revisions in 
5Text of the Soviet-Yugoslav DeclaI'ation, 3 ,June 1955. In Floyd, 
p, 223. 
6 . 
Criankshaw, p. 56. 
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Marxist-Leninist theory, basically up-dating it in accordance with the 
reality of the nuclear era. Politically, he was implying that the 
Soviet Union wanted to follow a more cautious policy--peaceful coexis-
tence. The natural means to this end was a rapprochement with the West. 
Further, the Soviet Union no longer encouraged~ wars of revolution. 
The differentiation was made between local wars which require bloc sup-
port and those wars of national liberation which did not require bloc 
support. No differentiation had been necessa~y before. These innova-
tions, coupled with de-Stalinization, marked a very different course for 
the Soviet ship of state. 
The new goals of the Soviet Union were a radical departure from the 
Stalinist goals. The most urgent post-Stalin goal was a relaxation of 
restrictions within the Soviet Union, as well as relaxation in interna-
tional relations. This was a necessary action in the face of the inse-
curity of the post-Stalin leadership. The ph:rase "detente with the West" 
was the practical expression of the theoretical "peaceful coexistence." 
Another of the new goals depended for its success on the implementation 
of peaceful coexistence. The economy of abundance was Khrushchev's gift 
to the people, as well as a part of the peaceful illustration of the su-
periority of the Soviet Union and the superiority of Marxist-Leninist 
ideology, It was also Khrushchev's personal goal. "He /Khrushche!7" is 
primarily concerned with turning Stalin's prison-house into a prosperous 
modern society materially as rich, or richer, than the United States. 117 
The other part of this goal was to prove the superiority of Soviet mili-
tary and technological might. This was achieved in the Russian coup of 
7 Ibid, , p. 229. 
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the 1957 sputnik. 
At approximately the same time that Soviet policy was moving to the 
right• Chinese policy took a sharp leftwardturn. 
Pekin /sic/ was embarking on a course which was to involve a 
tremendous swing from the right to the left •••• Very soon 
it was to lead to the adoption of the harshest and most un-
compromising attitude toward the whole of the outside world, 
and to split the movement. 8 
The manifestation of this leftward swing was a "go it alone" attitude. 
This attitude was a reaction to Khrushchev's wooing of Tito and the West 
and the new "peaceful coexistence," as well as a reduction of Soviet 
help. As Mehnert says: "it was not a question of the Chinese merely 
wanting to rely on their own efforts--they had no alternative. 119 
The Great Leap Forward emerged out of economic desperation. Edward 
Crankshaw offers this observation of China in 1956-7: 
••• the economic situation in China was very ugly indeed. 
Rationing was stringent. Factories, railways, shipping, 
were being brought to a standstill for lack of coal. There 
had been severe natural calamities and, in addition, collec-
tivized agriculture was failing to produce enough food.lo 
Precisely when China needed help, the Soviet Union credited the Eastern 
European countries with a billion-dollar advance.11 China's econo~ic 
situation wa.s rather like the Soviet Union's had been in 1921. At that 
time Lenin himself retrenched.with the compromising NEP, In a similar 
situation Mao pushed even harder ahead. In August 1958 he announced the 
formation of the People's Communes. 
8Ibid., p. 75. 
9Mehnert, p. 359. 
lOcrankshaw, p. 75. 
11Ibid., p. 76. 
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Mani~esting the isolationist attitude in international afrairs, Chi-
nese relations with the rest of the world took a virulent turn. In spite 
of the erratic Soviet overtures to Yugoslavia, the Peking People's Daily 
said in May 1958 that 
the Cominform resolution of 1948 had been 'basically correct' 
in its attitud.e to Yugoslavia and that the new Yugoslav Pro-
gramme was 'a wild attempt to induce the working people to 
take the path of surrender to capitalism. 112 
In August 1958 the Chinese bombed the offshore islands of Quemoy and 
Matsu, all the while denouncing the American "imperialists." Further 
incidents in 1959 emphasized the reckless path of Chinese policy. In 
March the Chinese violently suppressed a rebellion in Tibet, and in 
September the Chinese invaded Indian border territories high in the 
Himalayas. It appeared that they were deliberately following a policy 
antithetical to Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence." What exactly were 
the foreign policy aims of China? 
Chinese Foreign Policy 
For two millennia China was the center of a world in which her for-
eign policy consisted of accepting tribute from inferiot> rtations. There 
were two classes of people in this world--those within civilization, 
Chinese, and those who were uncivilized, all others. Theirs was a 
closed, isolated world, little known to others. When the barbarians 
forced their way into China and eventually divided it into spheres of 
influence, even this did not prevent the Chinese from regarding them as· 
inferior. The Chinese esteemed the Westerner's technology, but only as 
a means of ridding China of him forever. The Westerner was still 
12rrom the Chronology, Floyd, p. 251, 
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uncultured. In the early twentieth century the guiding philosophy of 
Chinese intellectuals remained that China should learn about the modern 
inventions. but the solid base of Chinese society--Confucian thought--
was not to be disturbed. This proved impossible. China had to accept 
all of the Western ideas. "Unlike China, Russia was never in the dire 
situation of having to choose between immediate modernization without 
regard to the consequences, and the loss of its national freedom. 1113 In 
the agonizing process the old society broke down long before the Manchus 
lost power. The idea that China was the center of the world was part of 
old Confucian China. Whether this idea still exists is one of those 
imponderables of history.14 That China would like to regain her place 
in Asia and the world is not. 
The basic drive of Chinese policy is to make China strong once 
again. For over a hundred years China suffered humiliation, conquest, 
and a loss of culture at the hands of the Western nations, and even from 
13 Mehnert, p. 127. 
14c. P. Fitzgerald in his book, The Chinese View of Their Place in 
the World, suggests that China still retains the 't'r'a'ditional view thar-
China is the center of the world, superior to all others, a.nd lawgivers . 
to them. He further posits that China is consciously translating the 
old Confucian idea of China into the contemporary idea of serving as a 
model for all other underdeveloped countries. "These arguments /that 
China should be a model for Asia and the other underdeveloped countries7 
amounted to a restatement in modern terms of two of the fundamental pos-
tulates of the old Chinese view of the world: that China was the centre 
of civilization, the model which less advanced states and peoples should 
copy if they were to be accepted within the pale, ,and that· .the ruler ·of 
China was the expounder of orthodox doctrine." C, P. Fitzgerald, The 
Chinese View of Their Place in the World (London, 1964), p. 49. -
Thissam;-dr1ve has bee~mentioned by others, as Howard Boorman: 
"One might suggest, therefore, that the ultimate goal of Peking's for-
eign policy is actually only a Communist adaption of a very ancient 
Chinese tenet: the irrestible capacity of the Chinese to expand their 
influence in Asia in periods of strong and energetic central govern-
ment." Boorman, p. 29. 
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Japan, a fellow Asian power, stronger than China because she had Western-
ized in the late nineteenth century. The result was a paradoxical infe-
riority/superiority feeling. China had been proven inferior mili~arily, 
yet she was still convinced of her cultural superiority. The nation to 
which she had given culture had defeated her militarily by adopting West-
ern knowledge, The only solution was for China to Westernize also. In 
the ensuing anarchy of civil war, invasions, international war, warlord-
ism, and Westernization, the only strong force to emerge was Communism, 
which united the country and proved adept at strengthening it. Now1 China 
could avenge her humiliations, become Chinese again, and assume her 
rightful place in the world. 
In foreign policy this basic drive of China assumes the form of 
first desiring to reassert her place as leader of Asia. This ancient 
goal has been extended in the modern world, in which no isolation is 
possible, to include acquiring the place in world councils which is due 
to a country which has more people than any other, and which is one of 
the largest in the world. 
The drive to recover territorial integrity was one of the first 
goals China set out to accomplish. Before the entrance of the Western-
ers into the East there existed a delicate system of tributary government 
with its center in Peking. China either exerted direct governmental con-
trol over a number of states, or exerted a more tenuous control of "indi-
rect rule," in which direct contr~l was exercised by the local ruler but 
a recognition of China's suzerainity and payment of tribute were required, 
These areas were regarded as Chinese. They were not only under Chinese 
rule, but they had accepted to a greater or lesser extent Chinese cul-
ture. This is what made them Chinese, more than mere governmental 
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control. The extent of this area staggers the imagination with its popu-
lation, its riches, and the vastness of its size. China proper, Sinkiang, 
Mongolia, Manchuria, Korea, Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan, Burma, Siam, Hong Kong, 
Macao, Formosa, and all Indochina have at one time been considered Chi-
nese. 
In contiguous areas China has followed a policy of direct conquest 
whenever possible for the recovery of Chinese territorial integrity. In 
this respect China followed a policy similar to the Soviets in the early 
years of the Soviet Union, The first conquest was Tibet in 1950, No 
one objected when Chinese entered the country because Tibet was so re-
mote and because it had always been acknowledged as being under China's 
suzerainty, allowing for Tibetan "autonomy." Sinkiang had always been 
under Chinese rule, in spite of its Moslem, nomadic polulation, and the 
tenuous communications with China. The Soviet Union had virtually made 
Sinkiang a protectorate during the period between the wars, by the secret 
agreement with the Mongols in 1933. After much discussion, and the dis-
patch of Chinese troops to counteract the presence of Soviet troops, the 
Soviets have acquiesced in Chinese domination. Both China and the Soviet 
Union, however, use neighboring Moslem populations to wage the propaganda 
wars in Sinkiang.15 Nearby Mongolia had, from time immemorial, been dis-
creetly disputed between Russia and China, In 1921 Mongolia was declared 
independent by the 1921 treaty between the Soviet Union and Mongolia, 
Very quickly, however, it came under heavy Soviet domination in the 
inter-war period. Today, it occupies what could only be called a 
15consult Mehnert, Chapter X, "Both Sides of the Longest Frontier," 
for a discussion of Chinese and Soviet activity in both Sinkiang and 
Mongol.ia from one who has been there • 
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satellite position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. China, how.ever, even 
/ 
though she has acquiesced and renounc~d, an.y:·claim to Outer_ Mongolia,. 
still attempts to influence the count.ry·by using her own Mongol popula-
1tion in Inner Mongolia.~6 
On the other side of China North· Korea is another area of Chinese 
protection. The action in 1950 could be regarded as a probing operation 
to determine the strength of the opposition. If China could obtain the 
whole peninsula easily, it was worth the attempt. When full-scale re-
sistence was encountered, the operation was suspended. Similarly, the 
later incidents on the Indian frontier in 1958 and 1962 can also be con-
. 
sidered as a probing operation, to determine resistance to Chinese in-
fluence in Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim, as well as the Hi~alaya areas of 
India. Conquest here, however, is complicated by the proximity of India. 
In the non-contiguous areas China has employed Marxism-Leninism in 
a policy of propaganda and agitation. The most vital problem is For-
mosa. The Chinese would naturally like to obtain control of the island, 
for to have it under the control of any other country is a strategic 
disadvantage. In addition, of course, there are ten million Chinese on 
an island traditionally consideI"ed Chinese. The minimum goal is "the .. 
elimination of the hostile power of the Nationalist forces in Formosa, 
or at least the withdrawal of the American aid and alliance which alone 
make this power a menace. 1117 China has accepted t-he fact that it is 
impossible to obtain contI"ol directly as long as the United States 
l6see Robert A, Rupen, "The Mongolian People's Republic and Sino-
Soviet Competition," Communist StI"ategies ,!!!, Asia·, ed. 1 A, Do~k Barnett 
(New York 1 1963) 1 pp. 262-292, for a detailed discussion of Chinese 
activities in Mongolia. 
17Evan Luard~. Chinese Foreign Policy (London, 1957), p. 4. 
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Seventh Fleet is committed to its defense and as long as American aid 
supports Chiang Kai-shek's rule. Therefore, the primary Chinese tactic 
toward Formosa is virulent propaganda against the "American occupation," 
the "American imperialists," and offering the alternative of "peaceful 
liberation" of Formosa. 
The Chinese Government's aim from now on will almost cer-
tainly be to play on the patriotic and family feelings of 
the Chinese in Formosa. so that eventually (even if only 
after Chiang Kai-shek's death) these may help to bring 
about reunion with the mainland.18 
On another island, the British Crown Colony of Hong Kong, ,China has made 
little effort to gain control or to propagandize. No doubt, it serves 
China as a window to the world, so to speak, as well as a source of 
valuable foreign currency. Quite recently (May 1967) however, there 
have been demonstrations and riots against the British. Perhaps this is 
another type of probing operation. 
The second part of China's strengthening process is to provide for 
the security of her frontier. This has already been done to some extent 
in the re-subjugation of Tibet and Sinkiang, the efforts in Mongolia, and 
actions in Korea. The most immediate problem is in the area once known 
as French Indochina. Here the same forces at work in China in the l920's 
and 1930 1s, complicated by anti-colonialist feelings and false borders, 
have exploded. North Vietnam represents the nationalistic. Communist-
oriented nation, strongly tied. to China and· friendly to her, which China 
desires on her frontier. Vietnam, however, is strongly linked by colo-
nial history, culture, ethnology, and geography to the whole of Southeast 




China, on the whole, has followed a friendly policy toward all these 
co,untries--Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and Burma. Wherever possible the 
friendly state policy has been supplemented by encouragement of native 
Communist parties. In Thailand and Burma this has been relatively un-
successful due to fear of their large neighbor. Burma was, however, the 
first non-Communist country to recognize China, and China repaid her by 
concluding a treaty in January 1960 which gave Burma a few hundred square 
miles of worthless jungle.19 What China got in return was good will, 
which may, one never knows, be useful later. In Cambodia and Laos China 
has sacrificed some ideological principles concerning the local Commu-
~ist parties in exchange for friendly relations with the recognized 
governments. 
Throughout the area, therefore, the object has been the same: 
to encourage or to support friendly (or, even better, anti-
Western) governments which may eventually come more and more 
to be influenced by the weight of Chinese power in the area.20 -. 
•,-:-, ., 
A third part of China's foreign policy is the expansio-p:ijf Chinese 
-;·.:.-~·::"' 
influence, primarily in neighboring countries and all over Asia. In-
volved here is a wider area: Japan, India, Pakistan, the Phillipine 
Republic, and Indonesia. All these are "Asian" countries in the full 
propagandistic sense. However, they represent a different approach than 
Southeast Asia. They are not related to China culturally. China's goal 
in relation to them is to influence them to be "friendly" countries. 
Chinese attitudes toward Japan, the main "developmental model" 
rival in Asia, have undergone sharp changes in the fifteen or so years 
19E,. H. Rawlings, "Fundamentals of China's Foreign Policy," Contem-
porary Review, 207 (1965), pp. 8-11, 
20tuard, p. 10. 
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of the existence of the Chinese People's Republic. Initially China quite 
naturally regarded Japan with hostility. As the pattern of post-war con-
ditions in Japan became clear the Chinese attitude became less hostile. 
Chinabegan to urge Japan to free herself from "United States domination" 
and to enter into diplomatic relations with China. In more recent years 
the emphasis of Sino-Japanese dialogues has been on the possibility of 
trade between the two countries. The Chinese have encouraged visits of 
Japanese businessmen and exhibitions of their wares in China. In return 
there exists in Japan a considerable group of businessmen who would like 
to engage in trade with China. Japan's relations with China, however, 
depend on the United States. Japan, since 1952, has followed United 
States policy in all matters. As long as America continues its policy 
of isolating China diplomatically and economically Japan cannot do other-
wise. 
Chinese relations with India and Pakistan have been based primarily 
on their common Asianess and the repudiation of colonialism. Until the 
Chinese invasion of India in 1958 India was a "neutralist" country, quite 
friendly to both the Soviet Union and China, who were vying for her favor. 
The Chinese invasion has forced India to rely more on the West for sup-
port. Pakistan, on the contrary, has always been a member of SEATO and 
CENTO, formerly the Baghdad Pact,; and so theoretically a strong ally of 
the West. However, Pakistan was one of the first countries to recognize 
China. In return for this, China has evidenced a pro-Pakistan attitude 
on the question of Kashmir, as well as signing border agreements favor-
able to Pakistan, giving Pakistan some land in the Himalayas. 
The logical area for the expansion of Chinese influence is Asia. 
The importance to China of becoming the spokesman for Asia cannot be 
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emphasized too much. It will be a vindication of~ the• hundred_, years of 
humiliation, military defeat, and weakness. In consequence of her new 
awakening and new strength she is unquestionably the predominant Asian 
country. As a consequence of this position China is a Great Power in the 
full meaning of the word. However, she is not given the prerogatives of 
a Great Power. She is excluded from the United Nations, not recognized 
diplomatically by many countries, and cut off from trading with many 
countries. The originator of this",hostility. is the United~-States. Ameri-
ca is committed to support of Nationalist China and boycott of Communist 
China. It is for these reasons that China directs such virulent propa-
ganda against the United States. The quarrel is an ideological one, 
rather than one of national interest. The Chinese do resent the presence 
of American forces in Taiwan and the offshore islands. However, American 
influence in these islands is not based on a belief that they are her 
logical sphere of influence, but on an opposition to Communism as a 
doctrine. It is on this basis that the quar:r-el began between the two. 
Other than this China has concentrated most of her energy on Asia. "But 
in general the Chinese do not appear to be specially interested in the 
affairs of the Western world and can thus afford to remain indifferent 
or even hostile to Western opinion. 11 21 
The immediate goals of Chinese foreign policy are to regain all the 
power and lands which China. ever possessed, to assert herself as the . 
leader and spokesman for Asia, and to acquire status and recognition as 
a Great Power. A more remote goal of Chinese foreign policy would seem 
to be the advancement of Communism to all "proletarian and oppressed 
21tuard, p. 11 
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peoples of the World." In discussing this fourth aim of Chinese policy 
the tired questions arise: How Communist is China? and How Chinese is 
China's Communism? This topic has been much discussed vis-a-vis Russian 
Communism and undoubtedly will provide a fertile field for China scholars. 
However, this question lies outside the scope of this study. Suffice it 
to say that Chinese Communism is following much the same pattern which 
Russian Communism followed. In the early years after the victory Russia 
pursued a very ideologically correct policy of proletarian internation-
alism, urging the rest of Europe to follow her example and revolt. 
(Lenin actually expected the imminent demise of capitalism.) After a 
period of facing reality the Soviet Union under Stalin reverted to modi-
fied Tsarist policies and traditional Russian culture reasserted itself. 
The next step is the embourgeoisement under Khrushchev in which the 
I 
former revolutionary state becomes status-quo and begins to pursue. quite 
ordinary goals. China has already gone through the first step and tra-
ditional Chinese culture is reasserting itself in ever-increasing ways.22 
Much the same point can be discerned in a formal analysis of the 
changes in Chinese foreign policy made by H. Arthur Steiner in a paper 
entitled The International Position of Communist China. The debut policy - ------- -----
of Communist China in the years 1949-54 was epitomized in the slogan 
"Join the Revolutionariest 1123 China, too, thought that her own experi-
ences might quickly produce similar revolutions in Asian countries. In 
1954-57 Chinese policy became less militant, less idealistic and more 
22Klaus Mehnert discusses the reassertion of traditonal Chinese 
characteristics in a very humorous account in Chapter VIII, "The Party 
and Its Style," in Peking ~ Moscow. 
23H. Arthur Steiner, The International Position of Communist China 
(New York, 1958), p.a. 
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nationalistic. The slogan was "Union With All? 1124 emphasizing national-
ism, antipathy for colonialism, and ~he uniting of revolutionary inter-
nationalism with nationalist spirit. By 1957 the "dual policy1125 de-
veloped whereby China had to reconcile her ideological spirit with her 
goals of national interest. She began to follow one policy toward recog-
nized governments via diplomatic relations and another policy of support-
ing the subversive Communist parties. This is the period of the re-
emergence of Chinese national interest. 
Sino-Soviet Relations, 1956-1960 
In the attainment of her goals China expected the aid, help, and 
support of her "socialist ally," the Soviet Union, in pursuing both 
economic and political goals. This was a natural and logical expectation. 
In actual fact the Soviet Union was the only source from which China 
could expect to obtain help.26 China's immediate economic needs were to 
develop and industrialize the country and increase food production, as 
well as consolidate the government. Undoubtedly China's expectations 
were high when Mao went to Moscow in 1949. It is impossible to know 
exactly what, expectations were actually in Mao's mind, but David Floyd 
hints that they were not fulfilled. 
All we know is that it took them two months to conclude an 
· agreement that ought to have been concluded in a few days, 
Mao left Moscow a wiser and probably a sadder man.27 
24 Ibid., p. 15. 
25Ibid., p. 24. 
26Floyd, p. 10. 
27rbid., p. 13. 
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A glance at the 1950 treaties shows that Soviet aid was not large, cer-
tainly when compared with Chinese needs. Besides the size of the aid, 
all of it was in the form of loans with strict schedules of repayment. 
The Soviet Union made it clear that it expected prompt repayment, even 
from her "socialist brother." Soviet aid was increased in 1954 and 1958, 
but not to an appreciable amount, and very obviously for definite reasons. 
In 1954 aid was increased to consolidate the alliance in the wake of post-
Stalinist insecurities; in 1958 the increased aid was an effort to pla-
cate China in the hope that she would follow a less aggressive interna-. 
tional policy. In spite of the increases, this still did not make Soviet 
aid large by China's standards. 
Even from what little we know, it is clear that the Chinese 
Communists would have liked to receive more economic assis-
tance from t;;,e Soviet Union than Moscow has been willing to 
extend. 28 
The reasons for the niggardly Soviet aid are not hard to discern. 
Quite simply, China is an unfillable vacuum. For the Soviet Union to 
give China all she required would bankrupt her own economy, and thus 
prevent the attainment of Soviet goals. The Soviet Union was pursuing 
a policy of peaceful coexistence and desired the attainment of the econ-
omy of abundance. To have become deeply involved with Chinese economic 
assistance would have meant the sacrifice of Soviet goals indefinitely 
in order to help China achieve even a viable economy. In addition the 
Soviet Union may have become aware of the danger of strengthening a huge 
country on their own doorstep which might one day challenge her. 29 Then 
28Alexander Eckstein, "Moscow-Peking Axis: The Economic Pattern," 
ed. Boorman, p. 104, 
29Jean Polaris, "The Sino-Soviet Dispute, Its Economic Impact on 
China," International Affairs, 40 ( 1964), p. 648. 
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there is the vague hope that the Soviet Union could·keep China as a 
source of raw materials for.the industrial countries of the Communist 
bloc, One fact is clear: Soviet aid to China was never allowed to reach 
the extent of infringing on Soviet national interest, 
Part of Soviet aid to China was supposed to come in the form of nu-
clear weapons. In 1955 the Soviet Union announced that they were pre-
pared to put their knowledge in the field of atomic energy at the dis-
posal of other countries (those named were China, Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
Rumania, and the Soviet zone of Germany). 30 This was made more specific 
by an agreement of October 15, 1957, t~e Sino-Soviet Agr_eement on New 
Technology for NationalDefense. "The USSR agreed -;to supply China with 
a sample of an atomic bomb and technical data concerning its manufac-
ture.1131 Less than two years·later, this agreement was unilaterally 
scrapped by the Soviet Union, according to China. 32 It had become clear 
to China that the Soviet Union was not going to supply her with nuclear 
weapons, The resulting fact, that the Soviet Union ranks as a nuclear 
power and China does not, is unquestionably a vital point in the Sino-
Soviet conflict,· 
Neither the Soviets nor t~e Chinese have ever publicly discussed 
1 
their military or nuclear relations. It can be discerned that Mao was 
so impressed with the Russian sputnik of 1957 that.he coined his new 
phrase "The East Wind Shall Prevail 0~1er the West Wind." This at least 
shows that Mao.was impressed with Soviet technical achievements and 
30Mehnert, p. 304, 
3lo, s. Cax,lisle, "Sino-Soviet Schism," Orbis, 8 (1965), P•: 798. 
32Ibid, 
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c~psidered that China would also benefit from them. The reasons for the 
contrary--the Soviet refusal to. give China a nuclear capacity--are based 
on the premise that if the S~viet Unionigave nuclear weapons to China, 
the United States would have to give them to her allies. notably Ger-. ' ' 
many. 33 ·An unenunciated reason can be deduced from the radical attitudes 
of China. The Soviet Union was afraid the Chinese would use nuclear 
weapons indiscreetly. Since the Soviet Union was pursuing a detente with 
the West, this would foil her P?licy. Once again the limits of spcialist 
brotherhood were reached. 
China's pol;tical expectations and hopes of Soviet support in the 
attainment of political goals were equally futile. Until 1954 China had. 
not really developed a foreign policy. The first years of the Chinese 
regime were spent consolidating the victory, establis~ing the government, 
and fighting the Korean. War, which did pose a very real threat of inva-
sion of Chinese soil. Until at least 1954 foreign policy aims other than 
the completion of the revolution and defense of her territory could not 
be evolved. Meanwhile in the Soviet Union, Stalinist policies were still 
being executed. China had come into the Communist orbit with a status 
much like any other satellite. Under Stalin it could hardly have been 
otherwise. In 1954 the relationship was altered by the new leadership 
in Moscow and the emergence of China on the world scene. 
China's emergence into world affairs began in 1954 and continued 
through 1955 and 1956. At the Geneva Conference on Indo-China Communist 
.China was directly represented for the first time at an international 
conference. In early 1955 Communist China made its first attack on 
~3Ibid., P~ 799. 
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Chiang Kai-shekt a test of its new power which resulted in the obtaining 
of the Tachen Islands. 34 The same year China emerged as the major nation 
at the Bandung Afro-Asian Conference. The years of consolidation were 
over and China was making her bid for recognition in the Asian world. as 
well as in all the world. If 1954 and 1955 marked China's emergence in-
to Asia 1 1956 marked China's emergence into Europe. The occasions were 
the Polish and Hungarian crises. The fact that the Chinese sent Chou En-
lai to Europe indicates that China was expressing a direct interest in 
Europe not consistent with ordinary satellite status. 35 
The uprising in Poland and the outright revolt in Hungary forced 
postponement of the Soviet Union's implementation of its new policies. 
The new goals announced by Khrushchev were not put into action until 
1957 due to the repressive action necessary to settle the European crises. 
The blame for these outbreaks was correctly laid by a certain "anti-. 
party" group on Khrushchev's "revisionist" policies. By July 1957 
Khrushchev had defeated Molotov and the "anti-party" group. The new 
policies could now be put into operation. 
The manifestation of Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence" policy came 
in the form of summit meetings. The first proposal for a meeting with 
Western leaders was made by .Khrushchev in an indirect manner at a meeting 
of Byelorussian farm leaders in January 1958. The topic of the meeting 
was potatoes, but Khrushchev manag~d to insert a proposal for a summit 
34Mehnert, p. 387, 
35The part played by China in the repression of the two uprisings 
varies quite considerably from author to author. David Floyd barely 
mentions Chou's trip, while Edward Crankshaw says that "China saved 
Khrushchev." Since no documents of such an action are available, it 
can be summed up as ''significant" that Chou went. 
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meeting with the West to discuss major East-West issues. "He wanted to 
give 'peaceful coexistence' his own special meaning, welcoming face-to-
face meetings with the leaders of the West, and notably of America. 11 36 
The Middle East crisis of July 1958 offered Khrushchev his chance. 
The overthrow of the Iraqi government on July 14, 1958 led to the arrival 
of British and American troops in Lebanon and Jordan. On July 19 Khrush-
chev sent notes suggesting a meeting of the leaders of the Soviet Union, 
the United States, Great Britain, France, and India to erid the crisis. 
Macmillan's counterproposal was that the meeting should take place within 
the framework of the UN Security Council. Upon this proposal Khrushchev's 
enthusiasm cooled. He then made a sudden trip to Peking. On his return 
August 5 Khrushchev stated that he was not interested in a special ses-
sion of the Security Councii. 37 This was confusing, as before his trip 
to China he had accepted ~he proposal. By this time Britain and the 
United St~tes had recognized the new government of Iraq and the crisis 
was over. 
This episode illustrates ~wo points: the USSR was definitely inter-
ested in working with the West for "peaceful coexistence" and the USSR 
definitely acknowledged the status of China as an ally of some power. 
Whether there was a divergence of opinion between Moscow and Peking is 
a matter for speculation only, at this early stage of the dispute. 
Khrushchev's next attempt at a summit meeting was more successful. 
His visit to the United States was announced on August 31 1959. 
Moscow was jubilant: the long-sought summit of all surmnits, 
36crankshaw, p. 58. 
37 Mehnert, p. 391. 
the dual meeting of Khrushchev and Eisenhower, was in sight. 
In the exuberance pf this success, Khrushchev described the 
Soviet Union and the United States in his statement to the 
press as 'the two greatest states in the world' on whose re-
lationship depended war or peace on earth, and he quoted the 
Russian proverb: 'When the masters quarrel, the servants 
tremble.' 38 
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Peking also quoted a proverb: "The leopard cannot change his spots. 1139 
The Camp David talks ended on a rather optimistically phrased joint dee-
laration and Khrushchev left America for Peking via Moscow. His trip 
to Peking was anti-climactic at most. His reception at the airport and 
in the city was devoid of "spontaneous demonstrations" and Mao himself 
said nothing publicly.40 
While Khrushchev was making overtures to the West, Peking was car-
rying on actions diametrically opposed to Soviet policies. In August 
1958 Communist China bombarded the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu, 
which were held by Chiang's troops. The bombardment continued until 
October 25, but the expected invasion never came. In this matter the 
Soviet Union supported the Chinese actions, after a week's delay, by 
saying: "An attack on the People's Republic, the great friend, ally, 
and neighbor of our country, is tantamount to an attack on the Soviet 
Union. 1141 Moscow's support of Peking in fact went further than previous 
commitments of 1954 and 1955. However, as Mehnert notes, the timing 
was a bit slow. 42 Since this incident Communist China has continued to 
38Ibid., p. 395. 
39Ibid, 
40Ibid., P• 397, 
41Ibid. 1 p. 393. 
42Ibid, 
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bombard the United States with propaganda about Taiwan .arid the·,Taiwanese 
with propaganda about the non-existepce of two Chinas. The Soviet Union 
has tacitly supported this: 
Echoes of approval have usually been forthcoming from the 
Kremlin, and Moscow has supported the thesis that Taiwan 
is the exclusive concern of the Chinese People's Republic, 
which,. of course, also indicates its aloofness and the fact 
that it had no intention of interfering in a domestic Chi-
nese quarrel. 43 
Taiwan thus is the second point of difference in attitude toward the 
United States between the Soviet Union and China, 
The abrupt sharpening of tension by Chi.nese actions in 1958-9 has 
been greatly speculated upon, It is clear that some sort of abrupt 
change in Chinese strategy started in 1958, more specifically in August. 
August 1958 saw the announcement of the communes, as well as the bombard-
ment of the offshore islands. The reasons for this drastic shift in 
strategy still remain relatively obscure. However, it is known that an 
intraparty dispute similar to that of the Sovie:t Union's in 1957, oc-
curred in China in 1958. The struggle was between the radicals and the 
conservatives, or rather, the more conservative, and took place at the 
Eighth CP Congress in May 1958. That the radicals were the victors is 
obvious from later Chinese actions. 
In his articJ,e44 Roderick MacFarquhar posits that the struggle took 
place between factions led by Chou En-lai and Liu Shao-ch'i. He terms 
43Ibid,, p. 394. 
44Roderick MacFarquhar, "Communist China's Intra-Party Dispute," 
Pacific Affairs, 31 (1958), pp. 323-335. This article offers by far 
the most detailed description of the dispute, as well as some very 
interesting conjectures. 
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Liu's faction the "sloganeers.1145 Th~ sloganeers "substitute exhortation 
for planning1146 and rely on "straight hard work" to carry out policies.47 
Opposing the sloganeers were the right-leaning conservatives. who could 
be called pragmatists, and whose leader was Chou En-lai. The sloganeers 
won their victory in June-September 1957, which coincides with the begin-
ning of the anti-rightist campaign. Mr. MacFarquhar suggests that Liu 
Shao-ch'! was the victor primarily because he was·enunciating Mao's 
principles. Mao's belief in the peasants, their Chinese patience and 
long suffering work is a traditional part of Chinese Communist history. 
This was also Liu's position. An additional factor in Liu's victory, 
Mr. MacFarquhar contends, is the question of a successor for Mao. Liu 
represented the Party and the "mass line" method in which Mao clearly 
believes •. Without the presence of Mao,.Chou could have challenged Liu. 
As it was, Mao stepped in with his overwhelming influence and decided in 
favor of Liu and the radical group. But, it was not so much a question 
of personalities, or groups, as of a.voiding a possible repetition in 
China of the confusion in the Soviet Union after Stalin's death. Hence, 
MacFarquhar speculates that Mao and Liu were choosing a successor. Liu 
represented the party group, and a victory by him meant the victory of 
the Party and its organization, rather than an individual victory. This 
seems to be the final importance of the struggle: the strengthening of 
the Party. 
The victory of the radicals meant many things both internally and 
45rbid. 1 p. 324. 
46Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 1 p. 330. 
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externally. Internally it meant the end of the influence of the intel-
lectuals within the Party and the victory.of "idealismn in Chinese econ .. 
omic planning. This may be substantiated, notes Ml'. MacFarquhar, by 
looking at the "plans" of the Great Leap Forward: 
In fact it was not so much a programme as a list of desirable 
objectives: illiteracy to be wiped out within five to seven 
years, the major diseases and the four pests (rats, sparrows, 
flies, and mosquitoes) within twelve; local road systems and 
broadcasting networks were to girdle the country by 1967; and 
all wasteland and denuded mountains were to be. covered with 
foliage. 48 · 
This was to be ~ccomplished by mobilizing·the people for hard work and 
sacrifice. The radicals seemed to extend their reckless, illogical, 
idealistic attitude to international affairs. "The real reason for 
China's growing aggressiveness seems to lie in the fact that the radi-
cals wanted to extend their policy of the Great Leap from internal to 
external policies. ,,49 The extension of the. radicals I policies can be 
observed in Chinese actions in 1958 and 1959. 
The reasons for the victory of the radicals lie in Mao's taking·· a 
decisive role. What motivated Mao? His prejudice in the efficacy of 
peasant-based movements can be easily discerned. However, the shift in 
Soviet policy and the lack of extensive aid from the Soviet Union un-
doubtedly inf1u·enced his decision. It was a matter of using the only 
resource China has--:people. Making a virtue out of a necessity seemed 
to have become a part of Chinese policy. 
In 1959 twee incidents illustI'ated that the Soviet Union was not 
going to support her Chinese ally politically if this entailed a 
48Ibid., p. 325 
49 h . Me nert, p. 388. 
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dangerous international situation or interrupted Khrushchev's overtures 
to the West. In March a revolt in Tibet was brutally crushed by China, 
which caused the Dalai Lama to flee to India. The Soviet Union carefully 
avoided reporting the resultant dispute between China and India. "The 
Russians avoided comment on the Chinese action in Tibet by saying that 
it was an 'internal affair' of the Chinese people.1150 Again, this can 
be interpreted as tacit approval, or disapproval. Later, in September, 
China again invaded Indian territory. This time the Soviets commented: 
One cannot fail to express regret at the fact that the in-
cident on the Sino-Indian border took place. The Soviet 
Union is in friendly relations both with the Chinese Peo-
ple's Republic and the Re-public of India. • • • the assurance 
is being expressed that both governments will adjust the 
misunderstanding that has arisen. 51 
This was not quite the response China, as an ally and socialist brother 
of the Soviet Union, could expect. 
In addition to silent disapproval, Khrushchev positively criticized 
China on the subject of the Communes. In Po.land, in July 1959 1 he made 
a sharp attack on the communes saying that the people who advocated them 
"had a poor idea of what Communism is and how it is to be built. 11 52 
This was the first public disapproval Khrushchev voiced about the com-
munes, although he had called them "old-fashioned and reactionary" in a 
confidential chat with the United States Senator Humphrey, which later 
was made public, much to Khrushchev's anger. 
At this point, in August 1959 1 a very obscure affair involving the 
Chinese Minister of Defense, Peng Teh-huai, developed. It is the 
50 Floyd, p. 72. 
51TASS Statement on Sino-Indian incidents. In Floyd, p. 261 
52r1oyd, p. 65. 
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contention of some that Khrushchev attempted to unseat, thI-ough Marshal 
Peng, the leftist elements in the Chinese Party led by Mao. David Floyd, 
for instance, states that KhI-ushchev's policy toward China from the be-
ginning of 1958 had two elements: to increase Soviet aid to China, and 
"to oust Mao Tse-tung and the leftist elements from the Chinese leader-
ship. 1153 His vehicle to oust Mao was the person of Marshal Peng, who 
had been in various positions to have had contact with Soviet officials, 
as well as with the ·notorious Kao Kang. 54 In August 1959 Peng was re-
moved from his office as Minister of Defense and publicly disappeared. 
This has been widely interpreted as a result of his too close relations 
with Moscowo55 KhI-ushchev himself mentioned the affair in June 1960 by 
protesting Peng's dimissal and saying "that his only offence was to have 
taken the Soviet party into his confidence. 1156 Whatever the actual facts 
are, the affair and the suspicions engendered cannot have strengthened 
Sino-Soviet relations, although it might have had it been successful. 
Thus, in 1959·the Soviet Union failed to support Chinese actions on 
three occasions, each of which were aimed at regaining Chinese irrendenta. 
In addition, Khrushchev made some uncomplimentary remarks about Chinese 
domestic policies. The two countries were already following divergent 
53Floyd, p. 61. 
54Kao Kang was the Governor of Manchuria who was accused of repre-
senting "reactionary forces at home and abroad" and was removed from 
office only after Stalin's death, in 1954. He later committed suicide. 
At the time when he was Governor of Manchuria, Peng was commander of 
Chinese· fo:i!-ces in North. Korea. Mehnert, p. 152. · 
55see- David Ao Charles "The Dismissal of Marshal Peng Teh-huai," 
!h!. China Quarterly_, 8 (1961), pp. 63-76, for a discussion of this 
affair. · 
56 Floyd, P• 67. 
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paths: the Soviet Union was attempting to work out some sort ,of detente 
with the West, and China was following an aggressive policy, which, while 
not aimed directly at the West, was counter to Khrushchev's. The Soviet 
policy was aimed at preserving the status-quo, while the Chinese policy 
was directed toward changing the status-quo. It was as if two horses 
were in the same traces--one running, the other walking. This could not 
be a permanent situation. 
Conflict of National Interests in the Dispute 
In examining the Sino-Soviet dispute several important points have 
emerged. In 1956 the Soviet Union announced in ideological terms a 
change in domestic and foreign policy. This change was the end product 
of Stalin's death, and the leadership vacuum created by it~ The new 
goals were a relaxation of domestic and international tension which had 
developed in Stalin's latter years of rule, peaceful coexistence which 
required some sort of rapprochement with the West, and the economy of 
abundance to raise the standard of living for all Soviet citizens. These 
goals were interrelated and illustrated the turning away from the revo-
lutionary nature of previous Soviet policy. The new Soviet policy was 
in fact a status-quo policy. 
Shortly after the announcement of the change in Soviet policy, China 
underwent a comparable intra-party struggle and herself embarked on a new 
policy. China's new policy emphasized a mobilization of the people in a 
drastic new form--the communes--in an effort to increase production. In 
international affairs China was concerned with attaining Great Power 
status. Further, China made it clear by international conferences and 
diplomatic actions that she wanted to be the leader in Asian affairs. 
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There w,ere situations in the wo~ld which China was determined to change, 
In the years 1955-1960 it became abundantly clear that China was pursuing 
an aggressive. dynamic. revolutionary policy. 
Russia and China had formed an alliance in 1950. When the alliance 
was made China had no policy as yet, as the state had just come into 
existence. In the short space of ten years vast changes have occurred 
in China and Russia which caused one state to adopt a dynamic policy, 
and the other a status-quo policy. As was noted in Chapter IV these two 
types of policies are by definition opposites. That they could work to-
gether in an alliance formed on the basis that the two states have simi-
lar goals is a logical impossibility. This is the basic cause for the 
existence of the dispute. The goals of the Soviet Union and China have 
diverged. Thus, their alliance has become unworkable. In the years 
between 1956 and 1960 China and the Soviet Union conflicted on various 
issues, but continued to work together on others. and compromised on 
some. By 1960 it became apparent that compromise was no longer possible. 
If the Sino-Soviet alliance were a traditional alliance. it would 
have been dissolved and each could have sought new alliances with states 
of similar goals. However, the common adherence to Marxism-Leninism pre-
cludes the dissolution of the alliance. The organizational problem of 
the Communist bloc has arisen as a result of the Sino-Soviet dispute. 
In Stalinist times it was unquestioned that the Soviet Union made policy 
for all Communist countries, by virtue of its being the first Communist 
country, and also by virtue of the fact that Communism had been brought 
to various countries by the direct actions of the Soviet Union. When 
Communist China came into existence largely by her own efforts, it was 
the only Communist nation who could challenge Russia in size. As China 
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emerged as a potential Power, and as the interests of the two countries 
diverged, the physical challenge broadened into a challenge for power and 
leadership. 
The non-existence of an international Communist organization allows 
each state to theoretically be free to formulate its own policieso 
However, this was always conditioned by the traditional leadership of the 
Soviet Union, most particularly under the personality of Stalin. China's 
challenge to this traditional leadership after Stalin's death has forced 
the Communist bloc to consider a solution to this basic problem •. China 
favors an international organization, while the Soviet Union does not • 
. 
. Perhaps the Soviets recognize more clearly the problems involved in at-
tempting to legislate one policy for all Communist states due to the 
inherent differences among countries. Until this organizational problem 
is solved, there can be no solution to the problems of the bloc. How-
ever, the existence of the Sino-Soviet dispute, and the resultant divi-
sion of Communist parties around the world, _in fact preclude any agre~~ 
ment. By the very existence of the dispute China has obtained one major 




When investigating Sino-Soviet relations from a broad perspective 
it is imp·erative to remember the. historical background of Russia and 
China. In analyzing the recent Sino-Soviet dispute two background fac-
tors have been considered: cultural differences and historical relations • 
. Cultural differences exist among all nations which form alliances. How-
ever, in the case of Russia and China the differences are unusually 
marked. Race, religious attitudes, governmental traditions, and. finally, 
the process of Westernization have created very different cultures in the 
two countries. The only common cultural tie appears to be that both the 
Russian and Chinese states have hi~torically expounded a haughty attitude 
toward other nations--based upon religious messianism in Russia and upon 
cultural superiority in China. This common trait has not served to less-
en Sino-Russian differences. Hence, the cultural cleavages of Russia 
and China cannot be disregarded when analyzing their state relations. 
Ethnic discord has been among the numerous Sino-Soviet cultural dif-
ferences which have emerged in the current dispute. This ethnic discord 
has primarily been used by China to obtain support among the non-European 
peoples of the world. However, race as an issue in the Sino-Soviet dis-
pute appears to be only a propagandistic by-product of the present dis-
pute, certainly not a cause of the disagreement. 
Historic relations between Russia and China for centuries involved 
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compe~ition for control of the borderland areas between the two countries, 
which in turn was part of a wider struggle for influence in Asia. The 
current borderland dispute became part of the Sino-Soviet dispute in the 
early l960's when clashes occurred in Central Asia between Russian and 
Chinese troops. Both states have produced maps claiming territorial 
revisions. Neither state has, however, strenuously pursued the-.matter. 
This alone seems to illustrate that the borderland controversy emerged 
as an effect of the new dispute. The borderlands only became an issue 
after the dispute was well defined, at which time both states reasserted 
their historic territorial claims. 
The Imperial legacy of suspicion.and competition might have been 
over-looked had relations changed with the Communist rise to power •. Di-
rectly after the Bolsheviks gained power it appeared this might be so. 
From the mid 1920 1s there was an effort to cement ties between the Rus-
sian Communist Party and the Kuomintang. This, however, ended disas-
trously in 1927 as the result of Russian efforts to engineer a Communist 
take-over of the Kuomintang. For some years thereafter relations be-
tween the Russian and Chinese Communist Parties were less than cordial 
as a consequence of Mao Tse-tung's rural re-orientation of revolutionary 
strategy in China. Mao's peasant revolution was reluctantly condoned by 
Stalin only after Chinese Communist successes in the civil war had vindi-
cated Mao Tse-tung. China took her place as a member of the Communist 
bloc after 1949 with much the same sense of pride and independence as 
Yugoslavia and Albania. 
Russia and China underwent revolutions with Marxism-Leninism as 
their governing ideology. They were bound together by this ideology 
because it specified similar perspectives and compatible paths of 
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developmento Paradoxically, their revolutionary experience unknowingly 
also produced a difference in perspective between the two countries which 
provided the irnmediate basis for the conflict. Between the two revolu-
tions w~s a difference of thirty-two years during which time Russia, in 
accordance with Mr. Brintonvs revolutionary schema, experienced a Thermi-
dorean reaction which blunted the former revolutionary goals. Alterna-
tively, China has not yet experienced a Thermidor, and still possesses 
her original revolutionary ardor and. goals. The resultant differences 
in ideological perspective provided the foundation for disagreement. It 
was only a matter of time before the actual dispute would develop. When 
concrete issues arose between 1956 and 1960 which required cooperation, 
the divergence produced by the revolutionary experience became obvious. 
The importance of the time differential in the Russian and Chinese revo-
lutionary experience is vital since it provided a basis for the dispute, 
a soil in which it could develop. 
Despite long-standing tactical differences arising from their indi-
vidual revolutionary experiences, the Russian and Chinese Communist re-
gimes cemented an alliance on the common tie of Marxism-Leninism. 
China's political isolation and insecurity vis=a-vis the United States 
cast China in the role of dependant upon the Soviet Union, which was 
bound to be a burden upon the strained Soviet economy. The Soviets at-
tempted to use Chinese economic dependency as a curb on Chinese domestic 
and foreign policy. Once the dispute developed, Soviet aid to China was 
first increased in 1958 as an obvious effort to influence Chinese politi-
cal behavior. When it became clear that economic aid would not deter 
China from pursuing her radical policies, aid was abruptly terminated in 
1960. Economic cooperation became another ca.sualty of the dispute. 
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The first years of the alliance were marked by apparent concord be-
tween the Soviet Union and China. An explanation for such smooth re-
lations was found in the fact that both countries were engaged in either 
external or internal crises which required all their attention. China 
was preoccupied with the Korean war and with legitimating the Communist 
regime. Simultaneously, the Soviet Union was convulsed from 1953 to 1956 
in the internal struggle for leadership after Stalin's death. An effect 
of this intra-party struggle was the formulation of new goals and new 
policies. The new goals consisted of a status-quo policy emphasizing 
peaceful coexistence and an economy of abundance. Some sort of easing 
of East-West tensions was necessary for Russia to attain these goals. 
Repercussions from the changes of Soviet leadership and policy led to an 
intra ... party conflict in China in 1957. The result of the Chinese intra-
party dispute was a leftward swing in policy which aimed at developing 
domestic economic sufficiency through the establishment of the communes 
and the recovery of Chinese irrendenta via a bellicose foreign policy 
which did not hesitate to antagonize the West or the USSR. A comparison 
of these post 1953 Soviet and Chinese goals showed a definite divergence. 
The Chinese had quite naturally expected the help of their commu-
nist ally. After the enunciation in 1956 of the new Soviet goals it 
became apparent to the Chinese that Soviet support would not be total. 
Since the basic goal of China is to regain Great Power status, it was 
necessary that she establish a viable economy, develop.her military 
power and redeem her unredeemed territories. Unfortunately these obj ec,-
ti ves conflicted with the Soviet goals of the economy of abundance ~nd 
peaceful coexistence. The Soviet Union did not wish to sacrifice her 
own economy indefinitely, nor did she wish to risk a nucl.ear war with 
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the West to help China. To help China would require some sacrifice of 
.Soviet national interest, involving accomodations to Chinese national 
.·· interest demands. 
Dependent economically on the USSR and isolated politically ~rom 
the rest of the world II China had no means, other than the ·d_ire threat . of 
war, to compel Soviet support-=except through ideology. To influence 
Soviet policy, the only alternative for China was to attack the Soviets' 
waning application of Marxism=Leninism •. Ideology had provided the bind-
ing element in an alliance which progressively had less and less in the 
way of common interests. After the Chinese disagreed with the Soviet 
ideological prono~ncements of 1956, the dispute was launched in an ide-
ological frame of reference. 
Analyzing the general notion of ideology 9 the conclusion emerged 
that ideology is employed in every state in order to obtain support or 
to legitimate policies. A classic divergence exists between the employ-
ment of ideology by a state as opposed to action based on a belief in 
ideology. In this the Communist states are neither exempt nor ~nique. 
Following this point to its logical conclusion, it can be ascertained 
that ideology has also been employed in the development of the Sino-
Soviet dispute as a means of discreet argument. Camouflage was necessary 
to disguise differences which theoretically should not exist, to limit 
the dispute, and to protect the unity of the Communist bloc and the ide-
ology itself. 
The basic question concerning the nature of the Sino-Soviet dispute 
was to determine to what extent it is an ideological quarrel. This 
question was answered by the post-1960 exchanges which ~eased to wholly 
concern ideological semantics and began to openly discuss matters of 
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prosaic politicso Compromise had failed. That the dispute had other 
than ideological roots could have been foretold by an analysis of the 
role of ideology in the Soviet Union and Chinai which in turn could offer 
clues concerning the role of ideology in the conflict. It is plain that 
ideology is not the source of the dispute, but merely a means of waging 
it. 
If not a quarrel over ideology, what then is the dispute? An inves-
tigation of the background relationships of the two states revealed that 
antipathy existed, but not to a degree strong enough to cause such a 
monumental dispute. An analysis of the national interests of the Soviet 
Union and China showed a divergence of very fundamental goals 9 goals 
deeply rooted in the national interests of the two states. This diver-
gence had arisen after the formation of the alliance and was not compat-
ible a decade later with the demands of cooperation which the ~lliance 
prescribed. Hence, a clash of interests erupted into a dispute having 
immense ramifications. Looking deeper into the basis for the change in 
Soviet and Chinese policies, I think a reason can be found for the 
changes in the revolutionary experience and the resultant difference in 
total perspective. This then was the elemental source of the dispute. 
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